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Is THERE A PLACE FOR "RACE" AS A LEGAL 
CONCEPT? 
Sharona Hoffman t 
ABSTRACT: What does "race" mean? The word "race" is omnipresent 
in American social, political, and legal discourse. The concept of "race" is 
central to contemporary debate about affinnative action, racial profiling, 
hate crimes, health inequities, and many other issues. Nevertheless, the best 
research in genetics, medicine, and the social sciences reveals that the 
concept of "race" is elusive and has no reliable definition. 
This article argues that "race" is an unnecessmy and potentially 
pernicious concept. As evidenced by the history of slave1y, segregation, the 
Holocaust, and other human tragedies, the idea of "race" can perpetuate 
prejudices and misconceptions and serve as justification for systematic 
persecution. "Race" suggests that human beings can be divided into 
subspecies, some of which are morally and intellectually inferior to others. 
The law has important symbolic and expressive value and is often 
efficacious as a force that shapes public ideology. Consequently, it must 
undermine the notion that "race" is a legitimate mechanism by which to 
categorize human beings. Furthermore, the focus on rigid "racial" 
classifications obfuscates political discussion concerning affirmative action, 
scientific research, and social inequities. When we speak of "racial" 
diversity, discrimination, or inequality, it is unclear whether we are 
referring to color, socioeconomic status, continent of origin, or some other 
factor. Because the term "race" subsumes so many different ideas in 
people's minds, it is not a useful platform for social discourse. 
This article proposes that "race" be replaced in future statutmy and 
jurisprudential texts by other, more precise terminology, including "color," 
"continent of origin, " "national origin," and "dese,ent from ancestors of a 
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particular color, national origin, or religion. " Thus, legislators would 
engage in more careful statutory drafting and determine their legislative 
goals more precisely. In addition, the law would teach that at most, the 
attributes we have called "race" refer only to superficial characteristics 
such as skin color or birthplace of one's ancestors, a lesson that could 
make a valuable contribution to social progress. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What does "race" mean? The word "race" is omnipresent in American 
social, political, and legal discourse. The concept of "race" is central to 
contemporary debate about affirmative action, 1 racial profiling, 2 hate 
crimes,3 health inequities,4 and many other issues. Nevertheless, the best 
research in genetics, medicine, and the social sciences reveals that the 
concept of "race" is elusive and has no reliable definition.5 This article 
explores the question of whether "race" is of value as a legal concept and 
concludes that it should not be retained in the legal lexicon. 
The origin of the word "race" is itself disputed, stemming perhaps from 
Arabic, Latin, or German sources.6 According to one authority, in 1684 a 
French traveler and physician, Francois Bernier, was the first to use the 
term "race" to describe human beings by skin color and appearance. 7 
According to another source, "race" was first utilized in natural history 
literature in 1749 by Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, to categorize 
groups ofpeople.8 
Until the Civil Rights era, "race," in the United States, served as the 
basis for discrimination, exclusion, and persecution through anti-
1. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003 ). 
2. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating 
Racial Profiling, 39 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 17 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for 
African American and Latina/a Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law 
Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REv. 341, 342 (2003). 
3. Christopher Chorba, Note, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional 
Misconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. 
L. REv. 319 (2001). 
4. Esteban Gonzalez Burchard et al., The Importance of Race and Ethnic Background in 
Biomedical Research and Clinical Practice, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170, 1171 (2003). 
5. See infra Part liLA-B. 
6. MICHAEL BANTON & JONATHAN HARWOOD, THE RACE CONCEPT 13 (1975). 
7. Id 
8. Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of 
Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 727 n.96 (1995); Ashley 
Montagu, The Concept of Race in the Human Species in the Light of Genetics, in THE CONCEPT 
OF RACE 1, 3 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1964). 
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miscegenation 1aws,9 laws restricting citizenship and immigration rights,10 
policies seeking educational segregation, 11 restrictions on voting rights, 12 
and other methods of marginalization. Notably, the label "race" was 
attached to a variety of groups that were deemed collectively inferior, some 
of which are not perceived as "races" today. For example, in his 1928 A 
Panorama of the World's Legal Systems, 13 the renowned legal scholar, John 
Henry Wigmore, wrote of the "Slavic race" to which he attributed a "racial 
tendency to egocentric unpractical dissension over ideals."14 
The United States is not alone in persecuting "racial" minorities. In 
Africa, European colonizers viewed native populations as primitive, 
subhuman, and "racially" and morally inferior. 15 Consequently, they 
coerced them into forced labor, seized their property, and otherwise 
exploited them. 16 Until the 1970s, Australia implemented discriminatory 
immigration policies and forcibly removed Aboriginal children from their 
families in the hope of diluting Aboriginal communities. 17 In Nazi 
Germany, 18 Cambodia, 19 Turkey/0 the former Yugoslavia, and other 
9. Judy Scales-Trent, Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: The 
Targeting Process, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 259, 283 (2001) (noting that anti-miscegenation laws 
prohibit marriage between members of different "races"). 
10. !d. at 287-91. 
11. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (holding segregation in public education to 
be constitutional). 
12. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (evaluating the constitutionality of 
Oklahoma's literacy tests for voting and its race-based exemption). 
13. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS VOLS. I-III 
(1928). 
14. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 735 
(1928). 
15. KURT JONASSOHN & KARIN SOLVEIG BJORNSON, GENOCIDE AND GROSS HUMAN 
RJGHTS VIOLATIONS 233 (1998). 
16. FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 235 
(1990) (stating that the Germans in Africa displayed a "blatantly racist attitude," describing the 
Africans "as baboons and treat[ing] them accordingly"); JONASSOHN & BJORNSON, supra note 
15, at 242 (describing the French colonials' treatment of native Africans). 
17. Martha Augoustinos et al., Genocide or a Failure to Gel? Racism, History and 
Nationalism in Australian Talk, 10 DISCOURSE & Soc'Y 351, 374 (1999). 
18. WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 116-33 
(1994). 
19. See R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 195-98 (1994) (stating that the Khmer 
Rouge were racists who "believed in the racial superiority of the dark-skinned Khmer over the 
Vietnamese, Chinese, Moslem Cham, and others" and who committed genocide against these 
minorities and against the Vietnamese in Vietnam after their incursion into that country). 
20. See id. at 226-27 (describing the Turkish massacre of Armenians during World War I 
and stating that many young Turks at the time believed themselves to be a master "race," which 
"manifested all the Great Virtues"). 
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countries/1 notions of "racial" purity have constituted the basis for genocide 
and ethnic cleansing. "Race," therefore, is not only of dubious meaning but 
is also a potentially dangerous concept that has been utilized to publicly 
validate the oppression and even mass murder of minority groups. 
By contrast, in the contemporary American legal system, "race" appears 
primarily in the context of anti-discrimination laws, measures to promote 
diversity, and affirmative action policies?2 The term is currently used to 
provide protection and benefits to those who are deemed to be minorities 
that have suffered a history of discrimination and political powerlessness.23 
Nevertheless, the concept of "race" remains problematic. 
The debate about the meaning of the word "race" is not new. As early as 
the 1930s one eminent commentator wrote: "[a]mong the words that can be 
all things to all men, the word race has a fair claim to being the most 
common, the most ambiguous, and the most explosive."24 Because the 
concept of "race" is prominent in a large number of anti-discrimination and 
other statutes, its incoherence is particularly troubling in the legal context. 
"Race" has been defined as a biological feature; 25 a local geographic 
population/6 a group linked by common descent or origin;27 a population 
connected by a shared history, nationality, or geographic distribution/8 a 
"subspecies"/9 and a social and political construct.30 The tenn "race" has 
21. Alain Destexhe, From Solferino to Sarajevo, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
READER 75-82 (Jonathan M. Mann eta!. eds., 1999). 
22. See infra Part II.B-C; see also Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, 
and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial 
Classifications, 48 V AND. L. REv. 513, 533-35 (1995). 
23. Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1213, 
1235 (2003). 
24. JACQUES BARZUN, RACE: A STUDY IN MODERN SUPERSTITION 3 (1937). Writing in the 
pre-World War II era, the author continues: "No one today would deny that it is one of the great 
catchwords about which ink and blood are everywhere spilled in reckless quantities. Yet no 
agreement seems to exist about what Race means." Jd. 
25. JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODJ:VERS!TY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY 108 (1995). 
26. DVORA YANOW, CONSTRUCTING "RACE" AND "ETHNICITY" IN AMERICA 47 (2003) 
(citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1488 (3d ed. 1992)). 
27. ld. (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 (1991)). 
28. Jd. (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW RivERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 968 (1984)). 
29. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et a!., The Meanings of "Race" in the New Genomics: 
Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L. & Ennes 33, 39 
(2001). 
30. Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jwy 
Selection, 11 LA RAzA L.J. 17, 31 (1999); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of What?, in 
RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATJ:VE ACTION 237, 238 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin 
eds., 1998). An article in Nature Genetics provided the following alternative definitions for the 
term "race": 
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been used interchangeably with "ethnicity," "ancestry," "culture," "color," 
"national origin," and even "religion."31 
Many argue that the growing population of people who are of mixed 
"racial" backgrounds makes "race" far less relevant in contemporary 
society. 32 Over six million individuals described themselves as members of 
two or more "races" in the 2000 U.S. census.33 
The question of whether "race" is a meaningful or useful concept has 
long been disputed among scholars in a number of disciplines, including 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, epidemiology, and public health.34 
• A vague, unscientific term for a group of genetically related people who 
share certain physical characteristics 
• A distinct ethnic group characterized by traits that are transmitted 
through their offspring 
• Each of the major divisions of humankind, having distinct physical 
characteristics 
• A group of individuals who are more or less isolated geographically or 
culturally, who share a common gene pool, and whose allele frequencies at 
some loci differ from those of other populations[.] 
Editorial, Census, Race and Science, 24 NATURE GENETICS 97, 98 (2000). 
31. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that "the 
notion of 'race' as contrasted with national origin is highly dubious"); ALAJN F. CORCOS, THE 
MYTH OF HUMAN RACES 10-11 (1997); Thuy N. Bui, The Difference Between Race and Color: 
Implications for Changing the Racial Discourse, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 629, 631, 638 
(1998); Fukurai, supra note 30, at 31; Atwood D. Gaines, Race and Racism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF BIOETHICS 2193-94 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995); Soo-Jin Lee et al., supra note 29, at 
54; Donal E. Muir, Race: The Mythic Root of Racism, in THE CONCEPT OF "RAcE" IN NATURAL 
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 93, 93-96 (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997) (hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF 
"RAcE"]. 
32. See Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, Comment, "What Are You?": Hapa-Girl and Multiracial 
Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 463, 466 (2000) ("The growing number of multiracial people in 
the United States challenges the existing racial classification system, highlighting its 
inadequacies."); Paul Tough, The Black White Supremacist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 25, 2003, at 
42, 56 ("Multiracial activism flourished during the 90's, with marches in Washington, 
magazines dedicated to interracial couples and a successful lobbying effort to include more 
complicated definitions of race on the 2000 Census fonn."). 
33. See Sharon Begley, Scientifically, Race Is On~v Skin Deep and Not Ve1y Useful, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 1, 2003, at Bl. 
34. See, e.g., AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL Ass'N, RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15: RACE 
AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 
1997), http://www.aaanet.org/gvt/ombdraft.htm [hereinafter AAA RESPONSE TO OMB 
DIRECTIVE 15]; AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Ass'N, THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING 
SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON RACE (2003), http://www.asanet.org/media/ 
asa_race_statement.pdf; Richard Cooper & Richard David, The Biological Concept of Race and 
Its Application to Public Health and Epidemiology, in THE CONCEPT OF "RACE," supra note 31, 
at 127; Fatimah L. C. Jackson, Anthropological Measurement: The Mismeasure of African 
Americans, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Scr. 154, 155 (2000); Soo-Jin Lee et a!., 
supra note 29, at 68-69; Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1994); 
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The debate about "race" has intensified in recent years in light of the 
Human Genome Projecf5 and the findings it has generated. A report 
published in Science in December 2002 asserted that genetic samples from 
individuals from fifty-two populations clustered into five geographically 
based categories: Europe, Africa, East Asia, Oceania,36 and the Americas.37 
To some, these findings confirmed the existence of "race" as a biological 
reality.38 By contrast, an article published in March 2003 in the New 
England Journal of Medicine argued that "although everyone, from 
geneticists to laypersons, tends to use 'race' as if it were a scientific 
category, with rare exceptions, no one offers a quantifiable definition of 
what a race is in genetic terms."39 In the spring of 2003 a national television 
audience was -exposed to the controversy when PBS aired a three-episode 
program entitled "Race-The Power of an Illusion. "40 
This article demonstrates that "race" is an incoherent concept that adds 
nothing to our understanding of human biology or social order. Moreover, 
the article argues that the law should discontinue its use of the term "race" 
because it is an unnecessary and potentially pernicious concept. Two 
primary arguments justify abandonment of the term "race": the expressive 
power of the law and the tangible harms caused by the concept of "race." 
First, the law has important symbolic value and often shapes public 
ideology through what scholars have called its expressive power. 41 As 
evidenced by the history of slavery, the Holocaust, segregation, and other 
human tragedies, the idea of "race" can perpetuate prejudices and 
J. Philippe Rushton, Race is More than Just Skin Deep: A Psychologist's View, 39 MANKIND Q. 
231, 231-47 (1998); Sally Sate!, Medicine's Race Problem, POL'Y REv. 49, 49-58 (2001); 
Wright, supra note 22, at 517-20. 
35. The Human Genome Project was an international research effort that analyzed the 
structure of DNA and map all human genes. Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic 
Testing, Genetic Medicine, and Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 849, 849 (1999). 
36. Oceania encompasses the islands in the South, West, and Central Pacific, including 
Australia and New Zealand. RivERSIDE WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1434 (1995). 
37. Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298 SCI. 2381, 
2381-84 (2002); see also David Rotman, Genes, Medicine, and the New Race Debate, TECH. 
REv., June 2003, at 41, 48, 50. For further discussion of this study see infra Part III. A. 2. 
38. Rotman, supra note 37, at 50. 
39. Richard S. Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1166, 1168 
(2003); see also Rotman, supra note 37, at 50 ("[I]t is possible to detect very small genetic 
differences between different populations if you look closely enough .... '[b]ut that doesn't 
support the idea of race."'). 
40. See Cal. Newsreel, Race-The Power of an Illusion (videotape review), at 
http://www.newsreel.org/nav/title.asp?tc=CN0149 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (describing the 
program as a "provocative new" series that challenges one of our most fundamental beliefs: 
"that human beings can be bundled into three. or four fundamentally different groups .... "). 
41. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. P A. L. REv. 2021, 2024-
25 (1996). 
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misconceptions and serve as justification for systematic persecution. The 
word "race" suggests that human beings can be divided into subspecies, 
some of which are morally, intellectually, and biologically inferior to 
others. 42 The law should avoid reinforcing such beliefs and should 
spearhead an effort to undermine the idea that "race" is a legitimate 
mechanism by which to categorize human beings. 
While for the last forty years "race" has been utilized in the law in order 
to protect and benefit minority groups, there is no guarantee that American 
law will never again authorize the marginalization of certain segments of 
the population. The notion that distinct biological "races" exist, for 
example, reinforces pernicious beliefs that African-Americans are 
inherently less intelligent than Whites43 or more prone to criminal activity 
and violence.44 These, in tum, can lead to racial profiling,45 employment 
discrimination, and other forms of intolerance and inequitable treatment.46 If 
we do not formally reject the idea that differences in appearance translate 
into differences in biology, intellect, and moral orientation, it is plausible 
that we could see a return to the familiar, widespread, governmentally 
sanctioned practices of segregating and oppressing entire groups because of 
their perceived "racial" characteristics. 
Second, the focus on rigid "racial" classifications results in significant 
tangible harms. It discounts the millions of Americans who are of 
"multiracial" origin47 and, therefore, do not fit into any single "race" 
category.48 Furthermore, it obfuscates political discussion concerning 
affirmative action, scientific research, and social inequities. When we speak 
of "racial" diversity, discrimination, or inequality, it is unclear whether we 
are referring to color, socioeconomic status, continent of origin, or some 
42. See discussion infra Parts III.B.2 and IV.A.l. 
43. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 276-.78 (1994). 
44. MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE MATTERS: RACE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT THEY MEAN 
213, 322 (Seymour Itzkoff ed., 1997). 
45. Carter, supra note 2, at 18, 24. 
46. See Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in 
Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 395 (2004) (expressing concern that the use of race 
as a basis for medical decisionmaking "may tend to validate the racism of others in society more 
generally"). 
47. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing debates concerning how the 2000 census should 
address those of multiracial origins). 
48. See Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 153 (1994) (discussing how common 
intermarriage has become in the United States and stating that within two decades, the 
frequency of interracial marriages in this country grew from 310,000 to 1.1 million); Begley, 
supra note 33, at B1 (stating that approximately six million Americans chose to identify 
themselves as members oftwo or more "races" in the 2000 census). 
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other factor. 49 When we detect "racial" differences in health status or the 
prevalence of certain diseases, it is dangerous to attribute them simply to 
biological differences and to ignore environmental, cultural, and economic 
factors. 50 Because the term "race" subsumes so many different ideas in 
people's minds, it often is not a useful platform for social discourse. 
Because it is incoherent and imprecise, it also does not serve as a reliable 
foundation for medical and scientific advancement. 
This article does not argue that individuals should no longer identify 
themselves as African-American, Hispanic, Jewish, etc. 51 These identities 
are central to many people's understanding of themselves in a way that is 
meaningful and empowering. Rather, I assert only that we should call those 
identities something other than "race." "Race" should be replaced in future 
statutory texts and jurisprudence by other, more precise terminology. The 
substitute wording can include "color," "continent of origin," "national 
origin," and "descent from ancestors of a particular color, national origin, or 
religion. "52 The appropriate language in each law would be chosen in 
accordance with the statutory purpose and the intended beneficiary class. 
Legislators would be induced to engage in more careful statutory drafting 
and to determine their legislative goals more precisely. In addition, the law 
would teach that at most, the attributes we have called "race" refer only to 
superficial characteristics such as skin color or birthplace of one's 
ancestors, a lesson that could make a valuable contribution to social 
progress. 
Part II reviews historical and contemporary U.S. statutes that have 
addressed "race" issues. Part III provides an overview of the controversy 
concerning the existence of "race" as an anthropological, sociological, 
psychological, and biological concept. It further analyzes the incoherent 
treatment of "race" in American law. Part IV argues that the law should 
reject use of the word "race" and offers specific recommendations for a 
methodology by which appropriate terminology can be substituted for 
"race" in particular legal contexts. 
49. For example, during the past decade some activists have argued that affirmative action 
programs should provide preferences based ·on economic disadvantage rather than purely "race." 
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. 
REv. 1913, 1913-14 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons 
and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1847, 1847 (1996). 
50. Jonathan Kahn, Getting the Numbers Right: Statistical Mischief and Racial Profiling 
in Heart Failure Research, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 473, 479 (2003). 
51. This article also does not attempt to define or discern the boundaries of specific 
categories, such as African-American or Hispanic. The focus is merely on the term "race." 
52. See infra Part IV.C. 
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY USE OF THE 
CONCEPT OF "RACE" 
Throughout American history, one's "racial" identity has been 
significant for purposes of determining one's social status and legal rights. 
For many decades legislators and the courts stmggled to determine and 
defme who was White and who was Black in this country in order to 
separate the privileged from those with limited or no privileges.53 "Racial" 
categories are just as important today, though for different reasons. The law 
seeks "racial" identification not for purposes of intentional discrimination, 
but largely in order to ensure equal opportunity for and provide benefits to 
members of minority groups.54 This part will review the use of the term 
"race" in the pre-Civil Rights era and the legal contexts in which the word 
is used in contemporary America. 
A. Brief Historical Overview 
Most obviously, in the pre-Civil War era, "race" was linked with 
slavery.55 In addition, during that era, free Blacks in Southern and some 
Northern States were prohibited from holding public office, from testifying 
in court, from assembling in groups of five or more, and from being out 
after nine at night without a lawful reason. 56 Numerous states prohibited 
marriages between Whites and Blacks57 in statutes known as anti-
miscegenation laws, which remained in force well into the twentieth 
century.58 In 1790, Congress limited naturalization to "any alien, being a 
53. See infra Parts II.A, III.C.1-2. 
54. See infra Part II.B. 
55. Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 ( 1806): 
In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the 
presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent on 
him to make out his right to freedom; but in the case of a person visibly 
appearing to be a white man, or an Indian, the presumption is that he is 
free, and it is necessary for his adversary to shew that he is a slave. 
!d. at 141; see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 61-150 (1980) 
(discussing slavery during the colonial period, including slavery in northern colonies such as 
New York and Massachusetts); Wright, supra note 22, at 522-24. 
56. Wright, supra note 22, at 531-32. 
57. For a discussion of how different states defmed "White" and "Black," see infra Part 
III.C.l. 
58. State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 502-10 (La. 1910); Scales-Trent, supra note 9, at 283 
(stating that in 1927, twenty-nine states had anti-miscegenation laws and listing the following as 
among those states: "Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming"); Wright, supra note 22, at 532; see also 
RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 18-
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free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the 
jurisdiction of the United "States for a term of two years."59 By 1860, no 
Southern State allowed the immigration of free Blacks.60 In 1870, Congress 
extended the right of naturalization to "persons of African nativity,"61 but 
until 1940 individuals of Asian descent and. others who were not White or 
African-American could not become naturalized.62 Throughout the early 
and middle decades of the twentieth century Southern States enacted and 
enforced Jim Crow laws· that established separate facilities for Blacks and 
Whites in services ranging from schools; public transportation, and 
courtroom witness stands to restrooms and drinking fountains. 63 
26 (2003) (stating that "[b]etween the 1660s and the 1960s, forty"one colonies or states enacted 
racial laws regulating sex or marriage" and discussing those laws). 
59. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795); see also IAN F. HANEY 
LOPEZ, WHITE BYLAW: THELEGALCONSTRUCTIONOFRACE42 (1996). 
60. Wright, supra note 22, at 532. 
61. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 
80, 18 Stat. 316, 318 (repealed 1952); see also HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 59, at 44. 
62. See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 59, at 44-45. In 1940, Nazi Germany was the only other 
country that had "race"-based restrictions on naturalization. !d.; see also Scales-Trent, supra 
note 9, at 289 (stating that, in 1945, "Nazi Germany and the United States had limited 
citizenship to members of 'racial' groups"). . 
63. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (reversing the ''separate but 
equal" doctrine found in Plessy v. Ferguson, ·163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 
(upholding the constitutionality of a state statute requiring separate railway carriages for Whites 
and Blacks); PHILIP A. KLINKER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 106-35 (1999) (discussing the Jim Crow era, 1908-
1938); Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action 
and the Case for Its Retention, 40 How. L.J. 145, 202 (1996) (stating that the Jim Crow era 
ended in 1970). 
The United States is not the only Western country that marginalized and ostracized Black 
individuals. Australian Aboriginees suffered a similar fate in past centuries. One source 
describes Australian policy as follows: 
In the era of colonial and post-colonial government, access to basic 
human rights depended upon your race. If you were a "full blooded 
Aboriginal native ... [or] any person apparently having an admixture of 
Aboriginal blood", a half-caste being the "offspring of an Aboriginal mother 
and other than Aboriginal father" (but not of an Aboriginal father and other 
than Aboriginal mother), a "quadroon," or had a "strain" of Aboriginal blood 
you were forced to live on Reserves or Missions,. work for rations, given 
minimal education, and needed governmental approval to marry, visit 
relatives or use electrical appliances. 
Loretta de Plevitz & Larry Croft, Aboriginality Under the Microscope: The Biological Descent 
Test in Australian Law, 3 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 104, 104 (2003) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted), available at http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/ljj/editions/v3n1/ 
pdf/deplev.pdf. 
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The early 1960s saw a change in the American legal climate with the 
advent of the Civil Rights era.64 Far from eliminating references to "race," 
however, contemporary legislatures have passed hundreds of laws that 
utilize the term "race," though by contrast to their predecessors, these are 
designed largely to protect and benefit minorities. 
B. Contemporary Federal Legislation 
In federal law, very commonly, the term "race" is utilized in statutes that 
establish anti-discrimination mandates. "Race" appears only once in the 
Constitution, in the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits governmental 
authorities from denying individuals the right to vote because of their 
"race."65 
The preeminent twentieth century anti-discrimination statute is the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA"),66 which prohibits discrimination based on 
"race," color, religion, national origin, and sex. Title VII of the CRA ("Title 
VII"), for example, provides that it is unlawful for employers: 
( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.67 
Title II of the CRA prohibits any discrimination or segregation that is 
established "by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a 
State or any agency or political subdivision thereof. "68 Other provisions of 
the CRA prohibit discrimination with respect to public accommodations69 
and federally assisted programs. 70 
64. KLINKER & SMITH, supra note 63, at 272-75 (discussing the Civil Rights Movement 
and the passage of the CivilRights Act of 1964). 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 (2000). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-l (2000). 
69. Title II of the CRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2000). The text reads: "All persons shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defmed in this section, without 
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Beyond the CRA, numerous statutes establish additional anti-
discrimination mandates. These apply to the following: housing,71 
interethnic adoptions,72 programs and entities receiving federal funding/3 
personnel decisions made by governmental entities 74 and unions, 75 insurance 
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.; see 
also 42 U.S. C. § 2000a(b) (1994) (describing which entities constitute public accommodations). 
70. Title VI of the CRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Providing for the enjoyment of federal 
assistance to all individuals without regard to "race," the provision reads: "No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." I d. 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). The provision prohibits "refus[ing] to sell or rent after the 
making of a bona fide offer, or ... refus[ing] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin." I d. 
72. 42 U.S.c.·§ 1996b(1) (2000) (prohibiting the restriction of adoptions or foster care 
placements based on the "race," color, or national origin of the prospective parents or the child). 
73. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6ll(a)(l) (2000) (state-run maternal and child.health services); 
id. § 3789d(c)(1)-(2)(D)(iii) (state criminal justice systems); id. § 5057(a)(l) (volunteer 
coordination services); id. § 5309(a) (community development programs); id. § 5919(b) 
(alternative fuel developers); id. § 6727(a)(l) (public works programs); id. § 6870(a) 
(weatherization programs); id. § 8625(a) (low income energy assistance programs); id. § 
982l(a) (community economic development programs); id. § 9849(a) (2000) (Head Start 
programs); id. § 9918(c)(l) (community services block grant programs); id. § 10406(a)(l) 
(family violence prevention and services programs); id. § 10504(a) (programs receiving federal 
funds through emergency federal law enforcement support); id. § 10604(e) (victim 
compensation and assistance programs); id. § 12635(a) (national and community service grant 
programs); id. § 12832 (affordable housing investment programs); id. § 1379l(g)(3) 
(Community Schools Youth Services and Supervision grant programs); 43 U.S.C. § 1747(10) 
(2000) (mineral mining economic development and relief programs); 49 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2000) 
(programs receiving federal funds under the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act or Railroad 
Revitalization Reform Act); id. § 5332(b) (General and Intermodal Transportation programs); 
id. § 47123 (airport improvement programs). 
74. 2 U.S.C. § 13ll(a) (2000) (covering Congressional personnel); 3 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) 
(2000) (addressing Executive Office personnel decisions); 5 U.S.C. § 230l(b)(2) (2000) 
(addressing merit-based personnel decisions); id. § 720l(b) (extending coverage to government 
employees in general); 14 U.S.C. § 182(a) (2000) (prohibiting racial discrimination in Coast 
Guard Academy appointments); 22 U.S.C. §§ 390l(b)(2), 393l(b)(l) (2000) (addressing 
equitable treatment in the foreign service); id. § 3905(b)(l), (e)(l) (covering the foreign 
service); id. §§ 6472(c)(l), (3), 6473(a) (concerning potential biases on the part of foreign 
refugee processors); 31 U.S.C.A. § 732(f)(l) (West Supp. 2003) (covering the General 
Accounting Office); 42 U.S.C. § 4728(g)(4) (2000) (prohibiting the federal government from 
requesting that local or state employees reveal their "race" identities); 47 U.S.C. §§ 398(b)(l), 
554(b) (2000) (forbidding "racial" discrimination in the employment practices of the FCC); 50 
U.S.C. app. § 455(a)(l) (2000) (prohibiting "race" and color-based discrimination in the hiring 
of persons for the Selective Service). 
75. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) (2000) (defining "labor organizations" and stating that the 
definition does not include "an organization which, by its constitution, bylaws, tacit agreement 
among its members, or otherwise, denies membership because of race, color, creed, national 
origin, sex, age, preferential or nonpreferential civil service status, political affiliation, marital 
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providers offering policies to government employees,76 state food stamp 
programs,77 the granting of visas,78 naturalization,79 refugee assistance and 
services,80 membership in veterans' associations and other organizations 
linked with the armed forces,81 the Olympic Committee,82 banking,83 
mortgages,84 credit,85 jury service,86 criminal justice,87 education,88 foreign 
status, or handicapping condition"); see also id. § 7116(b)(4) (asserting that it is an unfair labor 
practice for a labor organization to engage in "race" discrimination); 22 U .S.C. §§ 41 02(11 )(A), 
4115(b )( 4) (2000) (addressing discrimination in foreign service unions). 
76. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(f) (2000) ( "A contract may not be made or a plan approved which 
excludes an individual because of race, sex, health status, or, at the time of the first opportunity 
to emoll, because of age."). 
77. 7 U.S. C. § 2020(c) (2000) ("In the certification of applicant households for the food 
stamp program, there shall be no discrimination by reason of race, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, or political beliefs."). 
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(l)(A) (2000) ("Except as specifically provided ... no person shall 
... be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's race, 
sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence."); id. § 1187(c){6) (mandating that the 
govermnent may not use "race" as a category in the calculation of visa refusal rates). 
79. Id. § 1422 ("The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States 
shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is married."). 
80. Id. § 1522 (a)(5) (domestic resettlement programs and refugee assistance). 
81. 36 U.S.C. §§ 20204(b), 20205(c), 21003(a){4), 21004(b), 21005(c), 21104(b), 
21105(c), 22703(c), 22704(d), 40103(12), 60104(b), 60105(c), 70104(b), 70105(c), 80504(b), 
80505(c), 140704{b), 140705(c), 152904(b), 152905{c), 154704(b), 154705(c), 170304(b), 
170305(c), 170504(b), 170505(c), 190304(b), 190305(c), 210304(b), 210305(c), 230504(b), 
230505( c) (2000). 
82. Jd. § 220522{a)(8)-(9) (prohibiting discrimination in the treatment of athletes and the 
selection of directors). 
83. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(a)(14)(B)(ix), 1821(d)(13)(E)(iv), 1823(d)(3)(D)(iv), 3106a{l)(B), 
302 (2000). . 
84. Id § 4545(1). This section requires the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
to implement regulations prohibiting: 
I d. 
each enterprise from discriminating in any manner in the purchase of any 
mortgage because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, age, 
or national origin, including any consideration of the age or location of the 
dwelling or the age of the neighborhood or census tract where the dwelling is 
located in a manner that has a discriminatory effect. 
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(l) (2000) (prohibiting creditors from "racially" discriminating 
against credit applicants). 
86. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000) ( "No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or 
may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of 
the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude .... "); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1862, 1867(e), 1869(h) (2000). 
87. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 2H1.1(4), 5H1.10 (2000) (instructing that "[R]ace, Sex, National 
Origin, Creed, Religion and Socioeconomic Status ... [are) not relevant in the determination of 
a sentence"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2000) (requiring the court to instruct the jury not to 
consider race in capital sentencing deliberations); 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(l)-(2) (2000) (mandating 
that the "race" of an offender not be a factor in death sentencing); 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000) 
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policy,89 highway projects,90 tax law,91 local government programs,92 public 
health policies,93 voting rights,94 disaster assistance/5 aviation,96 and other 
areas. 97 
(requlling the United States Sentencing Commission to ensure that its guidelines are "race" 
neutral); 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (2000) (requiring that states receiving grant money to fund 
juvenile justice programs must provide assurances that the juveniles to be served will not be 
subjected to "racial" discrimination); id. § 14171(d)(l) (establishing that drivers stopped as part 
of the automobile theft-prevention program may not be chosen on the basis of "race"); id. § 
14193(7), (10) (requiring the National Commission on Crime Prevention and Control to 
determine the impact of crime on members of different "races" and to evaluate the 
government's ability to administer criminal justice in a "race" -neutral fashion). 
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1011(a) (2000) (prohibiting any institution of higher education receiving 
federal funds from using those funds in a study, project, or contract that bars individuals from 
participation based on their "race," religion, sex, or national origin); see also id. § 1066c(d) 
(prohibiting loans to "racially" discriminatory educational institutions); id. §§ 1071(a)(2), 
1078(c)(2)(F), 1087-1(e), 1087-2(b)(l), 1087-4, 1087tt(c) (addressing "race"-based 
discrimination on the part of various lenders); id. § 1228c (b)(l) (requiring educational 
institutions to place an anti-discrimination statement in all recruitment materials); id. §§ 
1652(a), 1701(a), 1702(a)(1), 1703(a), (c)-(e), 1704-1705, 1713(c), 1715-1717, 1720(c) 
(addressing issues relating to the invalidity of segregation policies and the appropriateness of 
particular desegregation mechanisms); id. § 1756 (establishing that school district lines are valid 
only if they are not "racially" based); id. § 2501(3) (requiring schools with career planning and 
development funds to reassess stereotypically "racial" career opportunities); id. §§ 6102(a)(13), 
6103(4)(C) (requiring career guidance and counseling services to help students overcome 
"racial" impediments and reach beyond "racially" stereotypical fields); 20 U.S.C.A. § 
723ld(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting "race"-based discrimination on the part of 
vocational schools and agencies applying for magnet school funding); id. §§ 7283a(3), 
7283b(b)(2)(A)(v), 7283d(b)(3)(E) (providing support and assistance for women suffering from 
"racial" discrimination). 
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (2000) (supporting international human rights for all 
individuals regardless of "race"). The provision reads: "The United States shall ... promote and 
encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.; see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 262p-4n 
(West Supp. 2003) (instructing the United States Executive Directors to multilateral 
development banks and the IMF to use their positions to promote non-"racially" discriminatory 
policies in the countries affiliated with the organizations); 22 U.S.C. §§ 2314(g)(2)(A)-(B), 
(4)(A)(i), 2755(b)(1) (2000) (mandating that agencies refuse to respect a foreign government's 
"racially" discriminatory policies and to participate in contracts and transactions that require 
respecting a foreign government's "racially" discriminatory policies); id. § 2426(b) (authorizing 
the President to withdraw economic development funds from any country that objects to the 
presence in its territory of a United States employee of a particular "race"); id. § 2504(a) 
(prohibiting discrimination in the Peace Corps) id. §§ 266la(2) and 2755(a) (prohibiting the 
government from fanning a contract with a foreign country that would require exclusion of a 
certain "race" from participation in the contract); id. § 3982(a)(2) (prohibiting "race"-based 
foreign service assignments); id. § 6401(a)(3) (stating that religious freedom is an international 
fundamental human right of every person regardless of "race"). 
90. 23 U.S.C. § 140(a) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor, before approving 
highway projects, to require states to provide assurances of equal opportunity in employment 
and apprenticeship programs). 
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Federal laws other than those that establish anti-discrimination mandates 
also use the concept of "race." For record-keeping purposes and in order to 
promote diversity and equal opportunity, Congress requires a wide variety 
of entities to provide reports indicating the "races" of those participating in 
and benefiting from various programs.98 Other provisions instruct 
91. 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (2000) (denying tax exemption to organizations that adopt 
"racially" discriminatory policies). 
92. 31 U.S.C. § 67ll(a) (2000): 
No person in the United States shall be excluded from participating in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under, a program or 
activity of a unit of general local government because of race, color, national 
origin, or sex if the government receives a payment under this chapter. 
ld.; see also id. § 6720(a)(8)(A) (2000) (defining what constitutes local government 
discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a){l8){A)-{B) (2000) (establishing the nondiscrimination 
obligations of state and local adoption and foster care programs). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 290ff-1(e)(2)(C) (2000) (requiring that children in need of substance 
abuse and mental health treatment be provided those services without discrimination "on the 
basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or age"); see also id. § 300b-8(b)(5) 
(providing funding for the screening and counseling of hereditary disease in children regardless 
of "race"); id. § 300w-7(a)(1) (addressing preventative health grants); id. § 300x-57(a)(1) 
(addressing mental health and substance abuse grants); id. § 11 504(b) (prohibiting the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development or Agriculture from modifying enterprise development 
zones if doing so would circumvent a "racial" nondiscrimination law). 
94. Jd. § 197l(a)(1) ("All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law 
to vote ... shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude .... ");see also id. §§ 1971(e), 1973, 1973a-d, 1973h, 
1973k, 1973aa-5 (addressing the right to vote and "race" discrimination). 
95. Jd. § 5151(a) ( "[T]he distribution of supplies, the processing of applications, and other 
relief and assistance activities· shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner, 
without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic 
status."). 
96. 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a)-(b) (2000) (forbidding domestic and foreign air carriers as well 
as governmental entities operating airports to discriminate against individuals because of their 
"race," color, national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry). 
97. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 719o (2000) (requiring federal officers to prohibit "racial" 
discrimination in the assignment of Alaskan natural gas permits); 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-1 (2000) 
(detailing that Community Relations Service's objective to provide assistance to groups affected 
by forms of"racial" discrimination that abridge constitutional rights or interstate commerce); 43 
U.S.C. § 1863 (2000) (stating that no person shall be denied access to outer continental shelf 
lands because of "race, creed, color, national origin, or sex"); 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(n) (2000) 
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race, language, or religion" in Guam, including 
attempts to obstruct voting rights); id. § 1708 (prohibiting "racial" discrimination in 
conveyances of submerged lands); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting citizens 
from participating in foreign-based "racially" discriminatory interstate and foreign boycotts). 
98. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2279-1(c)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (mandating that the Department of 
Agriculture report on participation in its program for "socially disadvantaged farmers and 
ranchers, according to 'race,' ethnicity, and gender" of participants); 7 U.S.C. § 5341(b)(4) 
(2000) (stating that "population subgroups" in dietary guideline reports include those based on 
"race"); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441 a( c )(1 5)(C)(iv)(I) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring banking 
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administrators to keep records of "race" data even if no formal reports are 
needed. 99 Furthermore, those applying for particular types of federal 
corporations to semi-annually report to Congress the "race" of each of their single-family 
residential property purchasers); 12 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring reports 
concerning the "races" of mortgagors); id § 1701z-11(1)(6); id 1723a(m)(l)(A) (requiring 
reports concerning the "races" of mortgagors); id § 4544(b)(3) (requiring the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development to report to Congress "racial" census data compared to 
economic and housing trends); id. § 4902(g)(4)(B)(i) (requiring reports concerning the "races" 
of mortgagors); 13 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2000) (requiring "race" data in the decennial delinquent, 
dependent, criminal, and defective class reports); 15 U.S.C. § 636U)(16)(B)(iv) (2000) 
(requiring the administrator of the Small Business and Capital Ownership Program to report to 
Congress a "racial" breakdown of the program's patrons); 16 U.S.C.A. § 
590h(b)(5)(B)(iii)(V)(ff), (v)(II) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring data concerning the "races" of 
nominees to local Conservation and Environmental Assistance committees and the "races" of 
the patrons using the committees' support); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1092(e)(1)(A)-(D), (F), 1226c(5) 
(2000); 20 U.S.C.A. § 63ll(h)(1)(C)(i) (West Supp. 2003); 20 U.S.C. § 6471(a); 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 6534(f)(1)(D), 6535(f)(l)(D), 6561i(a)(1), 6577, 7221d(a)(2)(A), 9543(a)(3), 9622(b)(2)(G) 
(requiring information concerning the "racial" identities of those benefiting from a variety of 
educational programs); 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(w) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring each District 
Court's Chief Justice to submit a report to the United States Sentencing Commission detailing 
the "race" of each individual sentenced); 29 U.S.C. §§ 721(a)(10)(E)(i)(I), 2935(d)(l)(A) (2000) 
(requiring "race" identity information concerning participants in vocational rehabilitation 
programs and Workforce Investment Systems); 38 U.S.C.A. § 7324(b)(l) (2003) (requiring the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit a report to Congress providing the "racial" 
breakdown of nurses without a bachelor's degree in nursing); 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-8(2) (2000) 
(requiring the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to report to Congress the "race" of 
individuals living in federally-subsidized housing); id. § 1885d(b)(1) (requiring the National 
Science Foundation Director to submit a biennial report to Congress listing the "races" of 
individuals with science and engineering positions); id § 3608(e)(6) (requiring the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development to annually report to Congress a list of its program 
participants identified by "race"); id § 3 796gg-3(b )(3) (requiring the Attorney General to 
submit to Congress a report indicating the "racial" identities of those utilizing programs to 
combat violence against women); id § 5617(1)(B) (requiring the administrator of the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Program to submit to the President and Congress an annual report 
detailing the "race" of the juveniles participating in the program); id § 5780(2)(A) (requiring 
states to list the "race" of the child in each missing child report); id § 12880(2) (requiring the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to annually report to Congress a list of its 
program participants identified by "race"); id § 1393l(c) (requiring "race" information 
concerning crimes committed in the vicinity of public transportation facilities); 47 U.S.C. § 
396(k)(11)(B) (2000) (requiring public broadcasting licensees to report the "race" of their 
employees to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting). 
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1221(c) (2000) (authorizing the Attorney General to instruct immigration 
officers to record the "race" of each resident leaving the country through the Canadian or 
Mexican border for permanent residence outside the United States); 12 U.S.C. § 4714(b) (2000) 
(requiring community development fmancial institutions to record the "races" of their patrons); 
20 U.S.C. §§ 6114(7), 6192(a)(2) (2000) (instructing the School-to-Work Opportunities 
program to record participation and outcome data of students in the program by "race"); 20 
U.S.C.A. § 9533(c)(7) (2003) (seeking "race" information concerning participants in research 
conducted by the National Center for Education); 42 U.S.C. § 287d-l(a)(2) (2000) (creating a 
data system that lists the "races" of all subjects having undergone medical research related to 
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funding must indicate the targeted population of beneficiaries, including its 
"racial" composition.100 The "racial" makeup of the community to be served 
is thus one of the factors considered in the award of these grants. 101 A 
handful of laws go as far as to explicitly mandate diversity in the 
composition of particular governmental bodies.102 
A few other federal law provisions that focus on "race" are noteworthy. 
Native Americans and Native Hawaiians are granted special privileges in 
some circumstances, and to ensure appropriate application of the benefits, 
the law must define who fits these "racial" categories.103 Reminiscent of 
their predecessors in the nineteenth century,104 the laws defme Native 
women's health); id. § 1397ii(b)(l) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to collect information 
concerning the number and "racial" identities of children without health insurance); id. § 
5119c( 4) (requiring that child abuse crime information include data about the "races" of 
"persons arrested for or convicted of, a child abuse crime"); id. § 9858i(a)(l )(B)(iii) (requiring 
states to record the "race" of children receiving assistance). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-1(d)(l)(D) (stating that applicants for grants to develop programs 
combating violence against women include "demographic characteristics of the populations to 
be served, including age, marital status, disability, race, ethnicity and language background"); 
see also id. § 12337(b)(2)(A) (requiring that grant applications for children's community 
programs include information concerning the "race" identities of those expected to utilize the 
programs); id. § 13704(a)(2)(A) (requiring states applying for truth-in-sentencing grants to 
report the "races" of all inmates who die during the incarceration process); id. § 13 811 (d)( 1 )(D) 
(requiring community organizations applying for crime prevention grants to note the "racial" 
composition of the communities to be served); id. § 15025(b)(l)(C) (requiring a state seeking 
funding for developmental disability programs to include in its application assurances that 
participants will reflect the "racial" composition of the state). 
101. ld. § 12527(b)(3)(B) (articulating a preference in the award of service-learning 
program grants to programs that will serve a diverse student population). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 56l'l(e)(l)(C) (2000) (requiring Landsat managers to seek advice from 
sources that are "racially" diverse); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12527(d) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring the 
state's chief executive officer to ascertain that the membership of the State Commission on 
Community Service Programs is diverse); id. § 12651a(a)(2)(D) (requiring the President to 
appoint a "racially" diverse board of directors for the Corporation for National and Community 
Service); 42 U.S.C. § 15025(b)(l)(C) (2000) (requiring that membership on state developmental 
disability councils reflect the "racial" diversity of the state); 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3) (2000) 
(requiring that local selective service boards reflect the "racial" diversity of the registrants 
within their jurisdictions). 
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (granting individuals born in Canada, who have at least fifty 
percent American Indian blood, the right to pass through the Canadian border into the United 
States); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-13b(l) (2000) (granting Native Hawaiians loan guarantees); 25 
U.S.C. § 451 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to accept donations intended to 
advance the welfare of the American Indian "race"). 
104. See infra Part III.C.l (discussing laws that established "racial" identity according to 
percentage of ancestry). 
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Americans and Native Hawaiians as individuals whose bloodlines are at 
least fifty percent attributable to those "races. "105 
Concern about "race"-related mistreatment plays a significant role in the 
arena of amnesty law. To be eligible for asylum, refugees must prove that 
they did not practice "racial" persecution in their respective homelands. 106 
At the same time, refugees who are innocent of wrongdoing are to be 
granted asylum if they are likely to suffer "racial" persecution in their home 
country after deportation. 107 
Finally, certain criminal provisions allow for enhanced sentences for 
those who commit crimes based on "racial" animus. 108 Judges have 
authority to deviate upwards from the federal sentencing guidelines in cases 
of "racially" motivated crimes. 109 
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000) (defining American Indians as "persons who possess at least 
50 per centum of blood of the American Indian race"); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-12(d)(1) (2000), 16 
U.S.C. §§ 396a(b), 396d(e), 410jj-6 (2000) (stating that a Native Hawaiian is "any descendant 
of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands before 
January 1, 1778"); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-17 (2000) (examining a 
provision of Hawaii's Constitution under which only persons whose ancestry qualified them as 
"Hawaiian" or "native Hawaiian" could vote to elect trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
and fmding that it violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
106. 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(42) (2000) (defining a refugee as one who is unwilling toreturn to 
her horne country due to a well-founded fear of persecution "on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," but excluding any 
person who participated in the persecution of others on any of the aforementioned grounds); id. 
§§ ll58(a)(2)(A), 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) (excluding aliens who participated in Nazi "racial" 
persecution); id. §1182(e) (prohibiting the Attorney General from deporting an alien to a 
country where the alien would be subject to "racial" persecution except where the alien in 
question has taken part in past "racial" persecution); id. § 1255a(a)(4)(C) (requiring that aliens 
wishing to become citizens establish that they have not taken part in past "racial" persecution); 
42 U.S. C. § 402(n)(3) (2000) (stripping aliens who have practiced past "racial" persecution of 
all governmental benefits). 
107. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(A), 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) (2000); see also id. § 1182(e) (prohibiting 
the Attorney General from deporting an alien to a country where the alien would be subject to 
"racial" persecution except where the alien in question has taken part in past "racial" 
persecution); 22 U.S.C.A. § 2730(a)(l) (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting the use of funding to 
deport an alien to a country in which she might suffer "racial" persecution). 
108. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2000) (detailing the severe criminal penalties to be imposed 
upon individuals who, in the process of committing a "racially" motivated crime, physically 
injure or kill another person); 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3Al.l(a) (West Supp. 2003) (instructing 
courts to raise a sentence by three levels if the crime was associated with the "race" of the 
victim); 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2000) (establishing, in the "Hate Crimes Sentencing 
Enhancement Act," enhanced penalties for hate crimes); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245(b)(2) 
(2000) (addressing criminal penalties for those who, under color of law, deprive others of their 
civil rights because of their "race"). 
109. See supra note 108. 
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C. Contemporary State Legislation 
The states generally have anti-discrimination statutes that parallel federal 
laws.no For example, most states have enacted employment discrimination 
statutes similar to Title Vll. 111 Other state provisions, much like the federal 
Fair Housing Act, 112 prohibit housing discrimination. 113 Some states have 
also enacted laws that parallel the federal Multiethnic Placement Act.114 
These statutes prohibit the restriction of adoptions based on the "race," 
color, or national origin of a prospective parent or child. 115 In addition, some 
states prohibit discrimination in areas that are not addressed by federal 
statutes. Some, for example, proscribe color-based discrimination with 
respect to burial of the dead. 116 
In addition, many states have enacted laws that are more aggressive than 
federal laws in combating "race" -based inequities. Over forty states have 
hate crime statutes that specifically criminalized offenses that are motivated 
110. See, e.g., District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-
2557 (1999) (proscribing discrimination by employers, real estate brokers, public 
accommodations, and educational institutions); Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 
363A.Ol-363A.15 (1991) (prohibiting discrimination with respect to employment, disclosure of 
medical records, property, public accommodations and services, educational institutions, and 
credit); Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 213.010-213.137 (1996) (prohibiting 
discrimination with respect to housing, commercial real estate loans, employment, public 
accommodations, and other areas); New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-49 (West 2002) (forbidding discrimination in employment, housing, and other 
areas); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2003) 
(forbidding discrimination in employment, labor organizations, public accommodations, and 
other areas); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the 
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. I, 27-28 (2000) 
(noting that some state anti-discrimination mandates extend beyond those of federal law, for 
example, by prohibiting discrimination based on sexual preference). 
111. Susan Elizabeth Powley, Exploring a Second Level of Parity: Suggestions for 
Developing an Analytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 44 VAND. L. REV. 641, 664 (1991); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (Michie 
1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 2002); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 37.2202 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 363A.03(1) (West 1991 ); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-1 01(8) (1989). For the texts of all 
state statutes, see 8A & 8B Lab. Rei. Rep. (BNA) 453:1-457:3513 (1990). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000). 
113. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE§ 49.60.030(1)(a) (2001); supra note 110. 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(l) (Supp. 2003). 
115. See, e.g., ARlz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01 (West 1999); CAL. FAM. CODE § 
8708(a)-(b) (West 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.308 (Vernon 2002); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.33.045 (2004). 
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 1204(c) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.341(1) (West 
2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-9 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 8, § 36 (1998). 
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by "racial" animosity. 117 A typical statute establishes that it is a crime to 
injure a person or damage her property because of the victim's "actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin."118 Several states 
have also passed laws that require local police departments to adopt policies 
proscribing racial profiling.u9 One such statute directs each law 
enforcement agency to develop a written policy "that prohibits the stopping, 
detention or search of any person when ·such action is solely motivated by 
considerations of race, color, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation."120 
At the same time, however, two states have ended government-
sponsored affirmative action programs. 121 In 1996, after voter approval of 
the well-known Proposition 209, California amended its constitution to 
prohibit "race" and gender-based preferences in public employment, 
contracting, and education. 122 In 1998, Washington state voters approved the 
very similar Initiative 200. 123 
117. See Gregory R. Nearpass, Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and 
Practical Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L. 
REV. 547, 547-48 (2003) (stating that "nearly every state has passed some form of hate crime 
legislation" and discussing constitutional challenges to hate crime laws); ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES LAWS, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/print.asp?&MSHiC=1252&L= 
10&W=LAWSA+laws+LAWSON+CR1M+crime+CRIMES+CRIM1+CRIMEIN+HATEIS+ 
hate+HATEA+HATEBASED+HATED+HATEM+HATER+HATERS+HATES+&Pre= 
%3CFONT+STYLE%3D%22color%3A+%23000000%3B+background%2Dcolor%3A+ 
%23FFFF00%22%3E&Post=%3C%2FFONT%3E (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (stating that 
forty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted hate crime laws). Federal law also 
has penalty enhancement provisions, though there is no general federal hate crimes law that 
deems "racially" motivated offenses to be "hate crimes." See supra note 108 and accompanying 
text. 
118. CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 18-9-121(2) (2002). 
119. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-lM (West 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
15A.190(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 590.650.5 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
504(1) (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 34.3 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 31-21.1-2 
(2002). Other states require law enforcement agencies only to record and report the "races" of 
the individuals stopped for traffic violations. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 42-4-115 (2002); KAN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 22-4604(a) (Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ ll4-10(2)(a) (2002); WASH. REV. 
CODE§ 43.43.480 (West 2004). 
120. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1m (West 2001) (establishing a January 1, 2000 
deadline for the adoption of these policies). In June 2003, the U.S. Justice Department issued a 
directive that banned routine racial and ethnic profiling by all seventy federal law enforcement 
agencies. The directive, however, allows for exceptions in cases in which there is specific 
information that members of a specific group are planning a terrorist attack, are engaged in a 
particular crime, or are members of a criminal organization. Curt Anderson, Race Profiling 
Bannedfor U.S. Law Agencies, PLAIN DEALER, June 18,2003 atA1, A3. 
121. Jeffrey M. Hanson, Note, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdotal Evidence 
Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public Contracting, 88 CORNELL 
L. REv. 1433, 1435 (2003). 
122. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. See infra Part IV.D.3 for a discussion of California's Racial 
Privacy Initiative, a proposed constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the state 
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III. DEFINING "RAcE" IN THE MEDICAL SCIENCES, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
ANDTHELAW 
The term "race" appears throughout American statutory codes in a 
variety of settings. As already discussed, some laws making reference to 
"race" establish anti-discrimination mandates, some proactively promote 
diversity, and others prohibit particular "race"-based conduct, including 
racial profiling, the commission of hate crimes, and even the 
implementation of affirmative action programs.124 But what does "race" 
mean? How, if at all, is it different from other, related concepts such as 
color and national origin? This part will explore these questions by drawing 
upon a number of other disciplines, including physiology, genetics, 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, that have grappled with the 
challenge of defining "race" and delineating "racial" categories. In addition, 
it will trace the convoluted history of the "race" concept in American 
legislation and jurisprudence. 
A. Is "Race" a Biological Concept? 
1. Efforts To Classify "Races" Through Assessment of 
Physiological Characteristics 
In the nineteenth century a number of scholars began deliberating the 
issue of "racial" differences, and some attempted to prove empirically the 
inferiority of the "Black race."125 Thomas Jefferson's book, Notes on the 
State of Virginia, was published in 1829, suggesting that "blacks ... are 
inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind:"126 In this 
book, Jefferson described numerous ways in which African-Americans 
were different from Whites in their physical, mental, and emotional 
capacities.127 
from classifying individuals by "race" in most circumstances. The measure was defeated by 
voters in November 2003. Californians Sink Racial Privacy Initiative, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,99405,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
123. Hanson, supra note 121, at 1435. 
124. See discussion supra Part II.B-C. 
125. TUCKER, supra note 18, at 17. 
126. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150 (1829). 
127. Id. at 145--46. For example, Jefferson wrote: 
Besides those of colour, figure, and hair, there are other physical 
distinctions proving a difference of race. They have less hair on the face and 
body. They secrete less by the kidneys, and more by the glands of the skin, 
which gives them a very strong and disagreeable odour .... They seem to 
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Some theorists, known as "monogenists," believed that all human beings 
originated from the same progenitors, as described in the Biblical account 
of Adam and Eve, and that the "races" resulted from different degrees of 
degeneration among human descendants. 128 Others, called "polygenists," 
held that human "races" originated from different Adams and that Blacks 
were a distinct and inferior species. 129 
Among the foremost polygenists in the United States was the Swiss 
naturalist and Harvard professor, Louis Agassiz. 130 He urged researchers to 
settle the "relative rank among ... races" because he believed that not all 
"races" had the same abilities, and thus they did not deserve equal positions 
in society. 131 Samuel Morton, a Philadelphia physician, heeded the call and 
collected over 800 skulls from around the world. 132 From these, he 
calculated the skull capacities of different "races," finding Caucasians to 
rank highest, Native Americans to rank lower, and Blacks to be placed 
last. 133 Morton's results have been discredited by contemporary scholars 
who have pointed out, for example, that skull size corresponds to body size, 
but there is no direct link between how large a person is and her level of 
intelligence. 134 
Researchers also explored the question of whether non-Blacks could be 
divided into "racial" categories. A German scientist, Hans Gunther, 
identified five "races" into which the European people could be divided: 
I d. 
require less sleep .... They are more ardent after their female: but love seems 
with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender delicate mixture of 
sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient. . . . In general, their 
existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. 
128. STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 39 (1981). 
129. Id. at 39-41. 
130. Id. at 42-43. 
131. TUCKER, supra note 18, at 18 (quoting Louis Agassiz, The Diversity of Origin of the 
Human Races, 49 CHRISTIAN EXAMINER 110, 142 (1850)). 
132. Id. 
133. !d. (citing SAMUEL MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA (1839)). Morton attempted to 
develop a scientific method for his study. He filled the skull cavity with white pepper seeds that 
he then transferred to a till cylinder from which he read the volume of seeds in cubic inches. I d. 
He also repeated the experiment with lead shot. I d.; see also Samuel Morton, Observations on 
the Size of the Brain in Various Races and Families of Men, 4 PROC. AcAD. NAT. Scr. PmLA. 
221-24 (1849). 
134. TUCKER, supra note 18, at 19-20. Stephen J. Gould reanalyzed Morton's original 
measurements and, after fmdirlg many serious errors, miscalculations, and omissions, published 
his conclusions. GOULD, supra note 128, at 50-69; Stephen J. Gould, Morton's Ranking of 
Races by Cranial Capacity, 200 SCI. 503, 503-09 (1978); see also JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE 
EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENIUM 46-4 7 (200 1 ). 
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Nordic, Mediterranean, Dinaric, Alpine, and East Baltic.135 Providing 
numerous photographs and sketches as illustrations, he discussed 
extensively the skull measurements, physical characteristics, and mental 
attributes of each of the five "races."136 · 
Jewish "racial" purity was of particular interest to nineteenth and early 
twentieth century researchers. 137 While the matter was debated in some 
circles, the Jews were perceived as a "racial" group by many authorities in 
Europe and the United States. 138 As in the case of other Caucasians, some 
scientists, basing their judgment on skull measurements and other physical 
characteristics, subdivided Jews into two or three "racial" types associated 
with their geographic origins. 139 
A centerpiece of the Nazi regime's philosophy was that Jews constituted 
a unique "race," of which the world must be purged. 140 In his notorious 
book, Mein Kampf, Hitler postulated that racialism was the essential 
principle of human existence, writing that "[t]he racial question gives the 
135. HANS F. K. GUNTHER, THE RACIAL ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 3-4 (G. C. 
Wheeler, trans., 1927). "Dinaric" refers to the Dinaric Alps, which constitute the southeastern 
range of the Alps, extending from the Adriatic coast through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro to northern Albania. !d. at 49; COLUMBIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/. 
136. GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 10-63. 
137. JOHN M. EFRON, DEFENDERS OF THE RACE: JEWISH DOCTORS AND RACE SCIENCE 22-
24 (1994); GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 74. 
138. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (noting that in the 
nineteenth century, when Section 1982 was passed, Jews were considered to be a distinct "race" 
and thus Congress intended to protect them against official and private "racially" discriminatory 
interference with property rights pursuant to the statutory mandate); United States v. Nelson, 
277 F.3d 164, 176-78 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment 
understood Jews to be a "race"); EFRON, supra note 137, at 20, 24-25 (stating that, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, some anthropologists began "to deny the Jews were a race at all, 
preferring to see them as a community of faith"); GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 74 ("There are a 
great many false ideas about the Jews. They are said, for instance, to belong to a 'Semitic race.' 
There is, however, no such race; there are only Semitic-speaking peoples, showing varying 
racial compositions."); Jay Weinstein & Nico Stehr, The Power of Knowledge: Race Science, 
Race Policy, and the Holocaust, 13 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 3, 5 (1999) ("By the early Weimar 
Republic, indeed not only in Germany but throughout the Christian world, it was not uncommon 
to defme a Jew as anyone who belonged to the Jewish 'race .... "'). 
139. EFRON, supra note 137, at 20-21, 24. Constantine Ikow, for example, divided Jews 
into the following groups: 1) those originating from Eastern and Southern Europe, the Balkans, 
Turkey, Algeria, Spain, Italy, and the Mediterranean region; 2) those from Western Europe, 
who had intermixed with non-Jews; and 3) Russian Jews, who exhibit no Semitic 
characteristics. !d.; see also GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 74 (asserting that Jews belong 
primarily to the Hither Asiatic and Oriental "races"). 
140. LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 1933-1945 xiii-xv, 18-20 
(1975); MARTIN GILBERT, THE HOLOCAUST: A HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF EUROPE DURING THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR 26, 280-85 (1985). 
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key not only to world history, but to all human culture."141 Hitler insisted 
that there existed a Jewish "race," the members of which were conspiring to 
dominate the world. 142 Accordingly, the Nazis designed the "Final Solution" 
by which they were to exterminate all Jews. 143 In order to effectuate this 
policy, the Nazis raised the science of "race" to new heights. They 
developed a methodology of identifying Jews and members of other "races" 
based on hair and eye color, the shape of nostrils, the skull, jaws, earlobes, 
posture, the position of feet at rest, and even gait. 144 
2. The Genetic Validity of"Racial" Categories 
During the past two decades, the focus of the discussion has shifted from 
the measurement of physiological features to assessment of genetic factors. 
In recent years a vigorous debate has developed in the fields of medicine 
and genetics concerning the validity of "racial" categories. 145 Some have 
asserted that "race" is "biologically meaningless,"146 while others have 
strongly supported the continued use of "race" for scientific purposes. 147 A 
review of the most current scientific findings will elucidate what, if 
anything, is known about the genetic validity of "race" and "racial" 
differences. 
Scientists estimate that human beings share 98.56 percent of their genes 
with chimpanzees. 148 Human beings have approximately 30,000 to 35,000 
genes, 149 and 99.9 percent of genes are identical for all human beings. 150 
While there is variation in the remaining one tenth of a percent, ninety to 
141. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 339 (Ralph Manheim, trans., Houghton Mifflin 2001) 
(1925). 
142. Id. at 651 (stating that "it is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over 
the nations"). 
143. See GILBERT, supra note 140, at 241-51. 
144. Scales-Trent, supra note 9, at 279. During the Holocaust, the Nazis murdered six 
million Jews as well as "a quarter of a million Gypsies, tens of thousands of homosexuals, and 
tens of thousands of 'mental defectives' ... [in addition to] several million Soviet prisoners-of-
war" and other noncombatants. GILBERT, supra note 140, at 824. 
145., Neil Risch et al., Categorization of Humans in Biomedical Research: Genes, Race, 
and Disease, 3 GENOME BIOLOGY 1, 1 (July 2002), available at http://genomebiology.com/ 
2002/3/7/comment/2007.3 (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
146. Robert S. Schwartz, Racial Profiling in Medical Research, 344 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 
1392, 1392 (2001). 
147. Burchard et al., supra note 4, at 1171; Risch et al., supra note 145, at 11. 
148. J.W. Jamieson, The Reality of Race: Contra Biondi and Rickards, 42 MANKIND Q. 
389, 399 (2002). 
149. Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Genomic Medicine-A Primer, 347 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1514 (2002). 
150. Rotman, supra note 37, at 42. 
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ninety-five percent of variations, which are called alleles/ 51 are found at 
equal rates in every population. 152 Consequently, only five to ten percent of 
all genetic variations (in the one-tenth of a percent of genes that actually 
vary) are distributed along geographical or continental lines.153 
Significantly, among the five to ten percent of variants in that tenth percent 
of variable genes that seem to be distributed differentially between 
geographical populations, there are no variants or alleles that are unique to 
one "race."154 
In 2002, several researchers published an article in Science reporting 
data from a study using gene samples from 1056 individuals from fifty-two 
populations. 155 They were able to identify clusters of alleles that 
corresponded to five major geographic regions: Europe, Africa, East Asia, 
Oceania, and the Americas. 156 Thus, the frequencies of the alleles that fall 
into the five to ten percent of variants in the tenth of a percent of variable 
genes clustered differentially across continental lines. 157 The researchers 
also concluded that people's self-identification as members of particular 
"races" correlated strongly with the genetic fmdings. 158 A second study, 
published in the American Journal of Human Genetics confirmed that allele 
frequencies in genetic samples from individuals from sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia, and Europe could be clustered into categories that correspond to 
those continents. 159 
Nevertheless, many scientists still insist that the notion of "race" is 
fictitious. One commentator explains that genetic differences demonstrate 
only that there is a very small "geographical structure that is present in the 
genome," not that the concept of "race" is scientifically valid. 160 Experts 
emphasize that intragroup genetic variation is dramatically greater than 
151. An allele is an "alternative form of a gene." Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 149, at 
1513. 
152. Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1167; Rosenberg et al., supra note 37, at 2381. 
153. Michael J. Bamshad et al., Human Population Genetic Structure and Inference of 
Group Membership, 72 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 578, 578 (2003). 
154. Leda Cosmides et al., Perceptions of Race, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 173, 173 
(2003). 
155. Rosenberg et al., supra note 37, at 2381. 
156. ld. at 2381-84; Rotman, supra note 37, at 50. 
157. Rotman, supra note 37, at 50. 
158. Rosenberg et al., supra note 37, at 2381; Rotman, supra note 37, at 50. 
159. Bamshad eta!., supra note 153, at 584. 
160. Rotman, supra note 37, at 50 (quoting Kenneth Kidd, one of the authors of the study 
published in Science). 
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intergroup variation, 161 so that interest in an expressed-trait difference is a 
social decision rather than a biological structure. 
Moreover, variation in genetic makeup and physical features is gradual 
and continuous, so it is impossible to demarcate where one "race" ends and 
another begins.162 For example, skin color, produced by a pigment called 
melanin, 163 slowly changes from one region to another so that people whose 
global distance from one another is small look more alike than those living 
far apart. 164 In addition, individuals who share skin color often have very 
different ancestry, as is the case for sub-Saharan Africans, New Guinea 
highlanders, and Australian aborigines, so that skin color, as a proxy for 
"race," is an unreliable indicator. 165 
To demonstrate how difficult it is to categorize individuals by "race," 
one study analyzed the "racial" designations of infants who died in their 
first year oflife. The study showed that 4.3% of babies categorized as Black 
at birth were deemed to be other than Black on their death certificates, and 
37% of those categorized as Native American on their birth certificates 
were classified differently on their death certificates. 166 Other data shows 
that most Ethiopians are more genetically similar to Caucasians than to 
other Africans. 167 Thus, some scientists caution against "implying that every 
individual has a fixed, unchangeable racial/ethnic identity that can be easily 
161. Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Race, Ethnicity, and Genomics: Social 
Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity, 12 GENOME REs. 844, 848 (2002), 
available at www.genome.org/cgi!doi/10.1101/gr.99202 (last visited Nov. 11, 2004); Alan H. 
Goodman, Why Genes Don't Count (for Racial Differences in Health), 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1699, 1700 (2000). 
162. Seymour Garte, The Racial Genetics Paradox in Biomedical Research and Public 
Health, 117 PUB. HEALTH REP. 421, 421 (2002) ("On a genetic level, human variation is a 
smooth continuum with very little evidence for sharp racially defined heterogeneities."); 
Goodman, supra note 161, at 17 00. 
163. Richard A. Sturm et al., Human Pigmentation Genetics: The Difference Is Only Skin 
Deep, 20 BIOESSAYS 712,712 (1998); see also THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 262 (1990). 
164. Goodman, supra note 161, at 1700; see also Bamshad et al., supra note 153, at 587 
("Our analysis is based on samples from regions of Africa, Asia, and Europe that are widely 
separated from one another. Accordingly, these samples also maximize the degree of genetic 
variation among populations."). 
165. Bamshad et al., supra note 153, at 587. 
166. Robert A. Hahn et al., Inconsistencies in Coding of Race and Ethnicity Between Birth 
and Death in US Infants: A New Look at Infant Mortality, 1983 through 1985, 267 JAMA 259, 
260-61 (1992). 
167. James F. Wilson et al., Population Genetic Stntcture of Variable Dntg Response, 29 
NATURE GENETICS 265, 266 (2001) ("Notably, 62% of the Ethiopians fall in the first cluster, 
which encompasses the majority of the Jews, Norwegians and Armenians, indicating that 
placement of these individuals in a 'Black' cluster would be an inaccurate reflection of the 
genetic structure."). 
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determined or that these identities sort themselves into mutually exclusive 
categories to which individuals can be validly and reliably assigned."168 
Can any general conclusions be reached from recent genetic studies 
concerning "race"? It appears that analysis of genetic samples can most 
often provide information about an individual's ancestors' continent of 
origin. 169 One source explains this phenomenon by pointing out that the 
environment exerts strong selective pressures with respect to some genes, 
including those for skin color, eye shape, body dimensions, and facial 
structure. 170 In particular climates and surroundings, certain characteristics 
are advantageous, as is the case for "white skin in cold dark regions and 
black skin in hot sunny regions," and thus certain alleles are selected over 
others. 171 Similarly, genes controlling the metabolism, immune system, and 
other bodily functions may vary from place to place because of different 
infectious organisms, food, and other living conditions. 172 Consequently, 
based on genetics, the more accurate terminology might be "geographic 
origin" or "continent of origin" rather than "race."173 
One might also ask whether "racial" categories are significant for 
scientific purposes. The issue is not merely one of satisfying human 
curiosity concerning biological phenomena. Since the nineteenth century, 
many have believed that "race" is at times associated with health outcomes. 
In 1896, the economist Frederick Hoffman published Race Traits and 
Tendencies of the American Negro in which he argued that the African-
American "race" was experiencing a downward slide in health and mortality 
because of which its death rate would soon outpace its birth rate, and 
extinction would become inevitable. 174 Consequently, membership in the 
black "race" was allegedly associated with disease and early death. 
Today it is believed that members of different populations have higher 
susceptibilities to different diseases and respond differently to certain 
treatrnents. 175 For example, "racial" differences have been demonstrated 
168. Judith B. Kaplan & Trude Bennett, Use of Race and Ethnicity in Biomedical 
Publication, 289 JAMA 2709, 2709 (2003). The authors explain that researchers, interviewers, 
medical personnel, and undertakers assign people to "racial" categories based on observations 
and assumptions concerning appearance, name, spoken language, and place of residence. These 
assumptions are not necessarily correct. !d. at 2710. 
169. Bamshad et al., supra note 153, at 584; Rosenberg et al., supra note 37, at 2381. 
170. Garte, supra note 162, at 422-23. 
171. Jd.at423. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 424; Risch et al., supra note 145, at 3. 
174. FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 
312 (1896). 
175. Risch et al., supra note 145, at 4, 9-10. 
1120 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
with respect to diabetes complications, 176 and researchers have detected 
genetic differences among "racial" groups that relate to HIV, Crohn's 
disease, and Alzheimer's disease. 177 In addition, one controversial study 
found that black patients with chronic heart failure did not respond well to a 
commonly used drug, leading some doctors to stop providing the 
medication to African-American patients. 178 
Some scholars passionately decry the use of "racial" categories in 
medical and public health decisionmaking, fearing a return to the prejudices 
and bigotry of past centuries. 179 They assert that health status and treatment 
outcomes are influenced not by "race" per se, but by education, 
socioeconomic background, diet, and place of residence. 180 Accordingly, 
ignoring these social and environmental factors and focusing only on "race" 
can lead to ignorant and misconceived medical and health policy decisions. 
In addition, these scientists point out that even if disease susceptibility 
varies among populations, illnesses are not exclusive to a single "race."181 
For example, sickle cell anemia affects not only those of African descent, 
but also people whose ancestors come from Greece, Sicily, and the Arabian 
Peninsula, and it is not prevalent among Black South Africans. 182 Likewise, 
Tay-Sachs, which is commonly associated with those of Eastern European 
176. Jd at 9-10 (thanking J. S. Kaufman & Richard Cooper, Commentary: Considerations 
for Use of Racial/Ethnic Classification in Etiologic Research, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 291, 
291-98 (2001)). 
177. Burchard et al., supra note 4, 1172-73. 
178. Derek V. Exner et al., Lesser Response to Angiotensin-Converting-Enzyme Inhibitor 
Therapy in Black as Compared with White Patients with Left Ventricular Dysfunction, 344 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1351, 1351 (2001) (explaining that Whites exhibited a "44% reduction ... in the 
risk of hospitalization for heart failure" when taking the medication enalapril, while Blacks 
experienced no significant reduction); Frederick A. Masoudi & Edward P. Havranek, Race and 
Responsiveness to Drugs for Heart Failure, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 767 (2001). But see Kahn, 
supra note 50, at 473-74 (arguing that the alleged 2:1 Black:White mortality ratio for heart 
failure is a myth and that the actual ratio is approximately 1.1:1 ); Ashwini R. Sehgal, Overlap 
Between Whites and Blacks in Response to Antihypertensive Drugs, 43 HYPERTENSION 566, 566 
(2004) (stating that "the majority of whites and blacks have similar responses to commonly used 
antihypertensive drugs"); Clyde W. Yancy et al., Race and the Response to Adrenergic 
Blockade with Carvedilol in Patients with Chronic Heart Failure, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1358, 
1358 (2001) (fmding no "racial" difference in the response of patients to this drug). 
179. Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1169. 
180. !d.; see also Kahn, supra note 50, at 480; Kaplan & Bennett, supra note 168, at 2712; 
Pamela Sankar et al., Genetic Research and Health Disparities, 291 JAMA 2985, 2987-88 
(2004) (cautioning that an overemphasis on genetics might cause health care providers to 
overlook environmental factors that contribute to health disparities). 
181. Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1167. 
182. Garte, supra note 162, at 423; Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes "Ethnic": Law, 
Commerce, and the Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L. 
& ETIDCS, 1, 39 (2004). 
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Jewish descent, affects French-Canadians and Cajuns at an equal rate and is 
also prevalent among individuals with Irish ancestry. 183 Finally, some 
caution against na'ive reliance on studies suggesting genetic differences 
among racial groups because so many people are of mixed ancestry. 184 
Other experts, however, are just as insistent that "racial" categories are a 
valuable scientific tool. They argue that whether different continental 
populations respond similarly to particular drugs is an important question 
that can only be answered by focusing on these groups separately, and 
various environmental factors can be taken into account in carefully 
designed research projects.185 In addition, knowledge of one's "racial" 
ancestry may expedite diagnosis because some tests are already tailored to 
screen for genetic abnormalities that are prevalent in specific populations.186 
Furthermore, even if "race" is only a social construct, racism and 
"racialized" social categories have real effects on health disparities between 
different social groups, and, therefore, it is scientifically useful to gather 
information based on these same "racial" categories in order to promote 
public health goals. 187 Finally, it is argued that "racial" identification of 
patients is significant for purposes of biomedical research so that 
investigators can be sme to include a diverse sample group in their clinical 
trials. 188 Without specific efforts to recruit minorities, many clinical trials 
183. National Tay-Sachs & Allied Diseases Association of Delaware Valley, Tay-Sachs & 
Canavan Diseases: What is Tay-Sachs Disease?, http://www.tay-sachs.org/taysachs.php (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
184. Kaplan & Bennett, supra note 168, at 2712 ("Apparent genetic differences are difficult 
to interpret when the underlying populations have mixed geographic ancestries, as do the Asian, 
black, Native American, and white populations in the United States."); Begley, supra note 33, at 
Bl (urging that ancestry, rather than "race," be considered in assessing individuals' varying 
responses to drugs). 
185. Burchard eta!., supra note 4, at 1174; Risch et a!., supra note 145, at II. The science 
of attempting to individualize patient care by determining how patients might metabolize 
particular drugs based on their genetic makeup is called "pharmacogenetics." See Morris W. 
Foster et a!., Pharmacogenetics, Race, and Ethnicity: Social Identities and Individualized 
Medical Care, 23 THERAPEUTIC DRUG MONITORING 232, 232 (2001). 
186. Burchard eta!., supra note 4, at 1174. 
187. Interview with Dr. Eric T. Juengst, Associate Professor of Bioethics, Case Western 
Reserve University School ofMedicine, in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 2, 2003). 
188. Burchard et a!., supra note 4, at 1174; see also The Minority Health and Health 
Disparities Research and Education Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-525, 114 Stat. 2495 (codified 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31 to -34 (2000)) (establishing the National Center on 
Minority Health and Health Disparities within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the 
mandate of which is to conduct and support research, training, and educational initiatives 
concerning minority health conditions); Barbara A. Noah, The Participation of 
Underrepresented Minorities in Clinical Research, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 224 (2003) 
(stating "that racial and ethnic minorities have less opportunity. to participate in potentially 
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would most likely include mostly if not exclusively white participants. 189 In 
the words of one commentator, "[i]gnoring our differences, even if with the 
best of intentions, will ultimately lead to the disservice of those who are in 
the minority." 190 
Racial profiling in medicine will be analyzed below. 191 For now, suffice 
it to say that even if data about a patient's color, national origin, or 
continent of origin is useful, its usefulness does not necessitate perpetuation 
of the "race" concept. While scientists might at times be justified in 
focusing their research on particular minority groups or in attempting to 
identify patients by specific appearance-related characteristics, 192 they need 
not rely on the incoherent concept of "race." What scientists in fact are 
generally interested in is the individual's color, national origin, continent of 
origin, or some combination of these. Clinical and research practices would 
actually benefit from greater precision if medical experts more clearly and 
explicitly articulated the identities upon which they are focusing. 
In sum, contemporary science has discredited the notion of "race" as a 
biological or genetic category. 193 Many scholars believe that "linking 
illness-or any other trait, like intelligence or athletic skill-to appearance 
is a fundamental scientific error." 194 While DNA samples might reveal 
information about an individual's continent of origin, 195 intragroup genetic 
variation is far greater than intergroup variation, 196 and no variant is unique 
to one "race."197 The biological sciences, therefore, do not support 
perpetuation of the "race" concept. 
beneficial clinical research" and that they were "commonly excluded from clinical trials until 
the mid-1990s"). 
189. Burchard et al., supra note 4, at 1174. 
190. Risch et al., supra note 145, at 11. 
191. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
192. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 46, at 395 (outlining the limited circumstances in 
which the authors believe that "racial profiling" in medicine is acceptable). 
193. Kahn, supra note 182, at 33. 
194. !d. at 34 (quoting Joseph Graves, an evolutionary biologist at Arizona State 
University); see also Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 46, at 400 (stating that "there is no reason 
to believe that real differences in intelligence, or other general behavioral traits, exist between 
races"). 
195. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
197. Cosmides eta!., supra note 154, at 173. 
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B. "Race" in Anthropology, Sociology, and Psychology 
The controversy concerning the existence of "race" has permeated other 
disciplines as well. This part will explore the issue of "racial" categorization 
in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology. 
1. Anthropology and Sociology 
Serious disagreement exists among anthropologists as to the significance 
of "race."198 Early in the twentieth century, Franz Boas, a prominent 
anthropologist who was a German immigrant to the United States, initiated 
an assault on the concept of scientific racism. 199 Boas demonstrated the 
fallibility of the widespread belief that measurable "race" differences exist 
in the areas of biological characteristics and behavioral pattems.Z00 
Many contemporary anthropologists likewise question or even 
conclusively reject the concept of "race."201 Several studies reveal that only 
half of physical anthropologists and less than one-third of cultural 
anthropologists maintain that homo sapiens can be categorized by biological 
"races."202 An entry in a dictionary of anthropology explains that "race" has 
no validity as a scientific concept because human populations cannot be 
divided into "fixed or discrete racial groups." 203 However, it notes that the 
significance of "race" lies in that "[a ]s a folk concept, race is employed to 
attribute not only physical characteristics but also psychological and moral 
ones to members of given categories, thus justifying or naturalizing a 
discriminatory socal [sic] system. "204 
198. Matt Cartmill, The Status of the Race Concept in Physical Anthropology, 100 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 651, 652 (1999) (detailing the arguments of proponents and opponents of the 
"race" concept). 
199. Gaines, supra note 31, at 2191-92. 
200. See FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE 3-17 (1940). 
201. Ryan A. Brown & George J. Armelagos, Apportionment of Racial Diversity: A 
Review, 10 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 34, 34 (2001); THE DICTIONARY OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 392 (Thomas Barfield ed., Blackwell 1997) ("Since 1960, the concept has 
declined in anthropology because of its operational ambiguity, arbitrariness, artificiality, and 
erroneous and harmful assumptions concerning biological and social differences."). 
202. Brown & Armelagos, supra note 201, at 34; Cartmill, supra note 198, at 652 
(reporting on several studies that highlight the difference of opinion among physical 
anthropologists). 
203. CHARLOTTE SEYMOUR-SMITH, DICTIONARY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 238 (1986); see also 
Gaines, supra note 31, at 2192 ("Throughout the last century and a half, enumerations of groups 
said to constitute races fluctuated from author to author" and that the number of so-called 
"racial groups is still changing."). 
204. SEYMOUR-SMITH, supra note 203, at 238. 
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The American Anthropological Association ("AAA") issued a 1997 
statement urging the federal government to discontinue its use of the term 
"race" in the gathering of data, because "'race' has been scientifically 
proven to not be a real, natural phenomenon. "205 This position was 
articulated even more strongly in 1998, when the AAA wrote that "[t]he 
'racial' worldview was invented to assign some groups to perpetual low 
status, while others were permitted access to privilege, power, and 
wealth. "206 
Recent years have ushered in a rekindling of interest in "race."207 Some 
anthropologists emphasize that the concept of "race" continues to be a 
powerful force that leads to divisions in the social fabric.Z08 Recognition of 
the importance of "racial" groupings in American culture is thus arguably 
necessary for certain scientific studies, such as those relating to health risks 
faced by particular minority groups?09 Forensic anthropologists also rely on 
"racial" classification, as they routinely categorize the remains of crime 
victims by "race.'mo 
205. AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 34. The AAA suggested the 
substitution of inquiries concerning "ethnicity" or "ethnic group." !d. For a discussion of the 
term "ethnicity," see infra Part IV.B.2. 
206. AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL Ass'N, STATEMENT ON "RACE," http://www.aaanet.org/ 
stmts/racepp.htm (May 17, 1998). Turning to scientific evidence, the AAA explained: 
!d. 
With the vast expansion of scientific knowledge in this century ... it has 
become clear that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly 
demarcated, biologically distinct groups. Evidence from the analysis of 
genetics (e.g., DNA) indicates that most physical variation, about 94%, lies 
within so-called racial groups. Conventional geographic "racial" groupings 
differ from one another only in about 6% of their genes. This means that 
there is greater variation within "racial" groups than between them. In 
neighboring populations there is much overlapping of genes and their 
phenotypic (physical) expressions. Throughout history whenever different 
groups have come into contact, they have interbred. The continued sharing of 
genetic materials has maintained all of humankind as a single species. 
207. Faye V. Harrison, Introduction: Expanding the Discourse on "Race," 100 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 609, 609 (1999) (stating that an increasing number of anthropologists are 
regaining their interest in the issues of "race and racism" after a long period of "indifference and 
inattention" to these matters). 
208. THE DICTIONARY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 201, at 394; Harrison, supra note 
207, at 610. 
209. Cartmill, supra note 198, at 652. 
210. !d.; Jamieson, supra note 148, at 396; M.L. Patriquin et a!., Metric Assessment of Race 
from the Pelvis in South Africans, 127 FORENSIC Scr. INT'L. 104, 107 (2002) (finding 
statistically significant differences in the pelvis measurements of white and black males); J. 
Philippe Rushton, Construct Validity, Censorship, and the Genetics of Race, 50 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST, 40-41 (1995) ("[N]arrow nasal passages and a short distance between eye 
sockets mark a Caucasoid, distinct cheekbones identify a Mongoloid, and nasal openings shaped 
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Sociologists have similarly debated the validity of "racial" 
categorization. Some have suggested that the concept of "race" be 
eliminated; others have suggested that it be retained for record-keeping 
purposes; and still others have recommended that "race" be specifically 
defmed and that "racial" classifications be precisely measurable and 
scientifically valid whenever they are used.211 
In 2003, the American Sociological Association ("ASA"), like the AAA, 
issued a statement on "race."212 The ASA noted the extensive evidence that 
indicates that "race" has a significant impact on individuals' educational 
opportunities, employment, health status, place of residence, and treatment 
within the social justice system.213 Consequently, the organization urged the 
continued pursuit of scholarship concerning "race," emphatically asserting 
that "[r]efusing to acknowledge the fact of racial classification, feelings, and 
actions, and refusing to measure their consequences will not eliminate racial 
inequalities. At best, it will preserve the status quo."214 
The proposal discussed in this article does not suggest that researchers 
stop conducting studies concerning the hardships faced by particular 
minority groups or the realities of being African-American, Hispanic, or 
another minority in the United States. My contention is only that theories 
and solutions concerning these issues can be formulated without use of the 
"race" concept. Researchers could identify subject populations as Black, 
White, Latino, etc. without categorizing them as "races." In fact, without the 
catchall term "race," social scientists might be able to better identify the real 
bases for discrimination and other inequities. Among these, in many cases, 
are color, national origin, continent of origin, and socioeconomic status, 
which are currently all subsumed under the misleading word "race." 
Abandonment of the "race" concept would not impede and could actually 
enhance the work of anthropologists and sociologists. 
like an upside down heart typifY a Negroid .... "); David K. Whittaker & Marina M. Bakri, 
Racial Variations in the Extent of Tooth Root Translucency in Ageing Individuals, 41 ARCHIVES 
ORAL BIOLOGY 15, 18-19 (1996) (finding "racial" differences in the translucency of teeth of 
people from different populations). Investigators, however, could just as well identifY bodies as 
Caucasian or African-American without utilizing the label of"racial identity." 
211. Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAW 
& INEQ. 7, 21-23 (1997). 
212. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Ass'N, supra note 34. 
213. Id. 
214. !d. at Executive Summary. 
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Psychologists, like their counterparts in other disciplines, have long 
debated whether people's "racial" identities differentiate them in any 
measurable way from one another. The claim that markedly different 
intellectual capacities are associated with different "races" is by no means 
new.
215 However, the contention exploded into a national controversy at the 
end of the twentieth century with the publication of the book The Bell 
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. 216 Its authors, 
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, analyzed the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Labor Market Experience of Youth, a survey that commenced in 
1979 and followed over 12,000 Americans ages fourteen to twenty-two. 217 
Herrnstein and Murray reported that the average IQ for African-Americans 
was lower than that of Hispanic, White, Asian, and Jewish Americans,218 
with African-Americans scoring on average fifteen to sixteen points lower 
than Whites on IQ tests.219 The authors also concluded that in contemporary 
society, those with high IQs generally achieve positions of power, wealth, 
and prestige, while those with low IQs are relegated to poverty and 
sociopolitical impotence.220 The authors believe that the ranks of the 
destitute, the criminal, the unemployed, those bearing children out of 
wedlock, and the socially maladjusted are populated by the unintelligent, 
and consequently, by a disproportionate number of African-Americans.221 
Herrnstein and Murray warn that America is moving towards a "caste 
society. "222 They provide a variety of recommendations, among which are a 
cessation of "subsidized" births for low income women, an increase in the 
accessibility of effective birth control methods, and changes in immigration 
policies to promote a merit-based system that facilitates the immigration of 
the most "worthy" foreigners. 223 
215. GRAVES, supra note 134, at 157. 
216. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 43. 
217. !d. at 36, 118-20. 
218. !d. at 272-80. 
219. !d. at 276. Herrnstein and Murray were not the first to identify a performance gap 
between Blacks and Whites on IQ tests. In 1969, Arthur Jensen published an article in which he 
contended that the IQ scores of Blacks were fifteen points or one standard deviation lower than 
those of Whites and hypothesized that genetic factors partially accounted for this discrepancy. 
Arthur R. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. Eouc. 
REv. 1, 81-82 (1969). 
220. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 43, at 25-27, 63-64. 
221. !d. at 127, 167, 191,235,253. 
222. !d. at 509. 
223. !d. at 548-49. 
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A second book written by Michael Levin, Why Race Matters: Race 
Differences and What They Mean, reiterated and expanded upon its 
predecessor's notorious conclusions.224 The book declared that African-
Americans are not only typically less intelligent than Whites, but also are 
disinclined to follow rules and are more aggressive, assertive, and impulsive 
than Caucasians.225 Furthermore, according to the author, Blacks have a 
different moral orientation from Whites, are far more likely to commit 
violent and nonviolent crimes, suffer from an absence of "conscience" and 
inability to monitor their own behavior, and have less free will than 
Whites.226 
This literature purports to establish comprehensive and reliable evidence 
for the existence of "racial" distinctions in terms of intelligence, behavior, 
and moral standards. Not surprisingly, the response was swift and powerful. 
The year 1995 saw the publication of The Bell Curve Wars, a collection of 
essays by twenty distinguished scholars.227 The commentators criticized 
Herrnstein and Murray for engaging in distortion of data and political 
advocacy rather than objective, scientific analysis.228 For example, there is 
no consensus among psychometricians that intelligence can be described by 
a single number known as a general intelligence factor, or "g."229 In 
addition, according to studies, there is at most a twenty percent correlation 
between IQ level and socioeconomic status.230 Thus, one's station in life is 
determined predominantly by factors such as birth, luck, practical skills and 
intuition, and other non-IQ factors. 231 
Many emphasize the shortcomings of IQ tests themselves: while they 
measure some language and math skills, they do not measure spatial, 
musical, or other types of intelligence that can be determinative of 
professional success.232 Furthermore, some test takers who perform poorly 
224. LEVIN, supra note 44. 
225. !d. at 213. 
226. !d. at 213, 322; see also Rushton, supra note 34, at 231, 242-47 (defending the 
concepts of "race" and "race" differences based on what the author fmds to be reliable evidence 
of differences in "brain size, IQ, violent crime, testosterone, sexuality, and AIDS."). 
227. THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven 
Fraser ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE BELL CURVE WARS]. 
228. Steven Jay Gould, Curve ball, in THE BELL CURVE WARS, supra note 227, at 11, 20-21 
(stating that the book is no more than a "manifesto of conservative ideology" and criticizing it 
for its "inadequate and biased treatment of data"); Richard Nisbett, Race, IQ, and Scientism, in 
THE BELL CURVE WARS, supra note 227, at 36, 53-54 (criticizing The Bell Curve for leaving 
out most of the relevant direct evidence for many of its conclusions). 
229. Gould, supra note 228, at 16. 
230. Howard Gardner, Cracking Open the IQ Box, in THE BELL CURVE WARS, supra note 
227, at 23, 26-27. 
231. !d. at 26-29. 
232. !d. at 29. 
1128 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
on examinations can nonetheless attain high achievements in natural 
settings, and even those with average innate abilities can become expert 
performers with sufficient training and practice.233 
The controversy concerning whether "racial" categories are meaningful 
and whether measurable differences exist among perceived "racial" groups 
thus extends to the field of psychology. The contention that distinct "races" 
exhibit significant variations in their intellectual capacities has been called 
the most "pernicious" idea "in the history of racial theory."234 The 
rekindling of the debate in the 1990s with the publication of The Bell Curve 
has made the effort to grapple with the meaning of the term "race" all the 
more necessary and urgent. 
C. The Law's Attempts To Define "Race" and Assign "Racial" Identities 
It is in the field of law that the concept of "race" has mattered mosf35 
and has been treated with the greatest confusion and inconsistency. One 
commentator recently argued that many historical legal actors have always 
considered "race" to be a social construct and legal fiction. 236 Nevertheless, 
throughout history, legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies have 
struggled to classify individuals by "race" and to establish bright-line 
"racial" categories. 
1. Legislative Efforts To Define "Race" and "Racial" Categories 
in United States Law 
In 1662 Virginia became the first jurisdiction to address the complexities 
of "race" identity.237 Faced with the dilemma of the uncertain status of 
children born to white slave owners and their black female slaves, the law 
declared that the child's status would be determined by that of its mother. 238 
233. !d.; see also Weinstein & Stehr, supra note 138, at 18 ("People learn to exercise the 
skills for which IQ tests reward points just as surely as they learn to read and write."). 
234. GRAVES, supra note 134, at 157. 
235. See discussion supra Part II (describing past and present U.S. laws that address issues 
of "race"). 
236. Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 
1473, 1476 (2003). 
237. Wright, supra note 22, at 522. 
238. Act XII, 2 Laws of Va. 170 (Herring 1823) (enacted Dec. 1662). The text reads, in 
relevant part: 
Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by an Englishman 
upon a negro woman should be slave or ffree [sic]; Be it therefore enacted 
and declared by this present grand assembly, that all children borne in this 
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During subsequent centuries, the determination of who belonged to each 
"racial" category remained an issue of state law, and the states implemented 
significantly different classification schemes.239 Generally, in slave states, a 
presumption was created that individuals appearing to be Black were slaves, 
and those claiming to be free bore the burden of proving their entitlement to 
freedom. 240 The states determined whether or not an individual was Black 
either by visual indicators or by ancestry, that is, by the "fraction" of black 
blood found in one's bloodline.241 In North Carolina, for a time, the standard 
was any visible admixture of black blood.242 Many states classified as 
''Negro" those who were at least one-eighth Black or had at least one Black 
great-grandparent.243 Other states considered only those who were one-
fourth or more Black to be Negro, 244 and still others utilized one-sixteenth 
or one-thirty-second rules.245 A person could, therefore, be considered 
White in one state and Black in another.246 By 1920, for purposes of 
segregation, most Southern states adopted the "one-drop rule" under which 
I d. 
country shalbe [sic] held bond or free only according to the condition of the 
mother .... 
239. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
240. Hudgins v. Wright, II Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 141 (1806) ("In the case of a person 
visibly appearing to be a negro, the presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is 
incumbent on him to make out his right to freedom .... "). 
241. See State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 501-08 (La. 1910). 
242. Id. at 502. 
243. Id. at 502-10; Wright, supra note 22, at 524. For example, South Carolina, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Indiana, all had one-eighth rules. 
Treadaway, 52 So. at 503-07. 
244. Treadaway, 52 So. at 504. Virginia and Nebraska had statutes featuring this defmition. 
I d. 
245. Okizaki, supra note 32, at 473; Wright, supra note 22, at 524; see also MELISSA 
NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP 70 (2000) (noting that the statutory definition of "White" did 
not change, if it existed at all, and generally required that a person have no trace of nonwhite 
blood). It is noteworthy that the Nazi regime used a similar approach in attempting to defme 
who was a "Jew." The category of "full Jew" included those with at least three Jewish 
grandparents. A Mischlinge of the first degree was a person with one Jewish parent, and a 
Mischlinge of the second degree had a single Jewish grandparent. Patricia Szobar, Telling 
Sexual Stories in the Nazi Courts of Law: Race Defilement in Germany, 1933 to 1945, II J. 
HIST. SEXUALITY 131, 144 (2002). In addition, a person with two full Jewish grandparents 
would be deemed a Jew if he was a member of the Jewish religious community, married a Jew, 
or was the illegitimate son of a Jew. The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race, First 
Supplementary Decree of November 14, 1935, Article Five (Dec. 14, 1935), available at 
http://www.mtsu.edu/~baustin/nurmlaw2.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); see also Scales-
Trent, supra note 9, at 265 (discussing changes over time in the laws defming "racial" status in 
Virginia and the Third Reich). 
246. See generalzv STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (Paul Murray ed. 1950) (detailing 
the laws of all the states, including their defmitions of "Negro"). 
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an individual with any black ancestry would be deemed Black.247 The 
legislatures, consequently, provided notably different interpretations of 
what it meant to be Black, and some changed their "racial" definitions over 
time.248 
2. Judicial Efforts To Defme "Race" 
Litigation arising from these laws required the courts to grapple with 
questions of "racial" definition. The courts were no more adept than the 
legislatures in developing a uniform, reliable approach to resolving "race" 
identity disputes. In Hudgins v. Wright/49 a case in which several slaves 
sued for their freedom, claiming descent from a Native American woman, 
two judges disagreed as to the evidentiary value of physical appearance. 
Judge Tucker stated that even if one's color is in doubt because of "racial" 
mingling, "a flat nose and woolly head ofhair," which disappear "the last of 
all," can serve as reliable indicators of an individual's status as "African."250 
On the other hand, Judge Roane asserted that when "races" become mixed, 
"it is difficult, if not impossible, to say from inspection only, which race 
predominates in the offspring."251 
A fascinating study of sixty-eight nineteenth century cases that were 
appealed to Southern state supreme courts showed that "race" was often 
detennined as much by individuals' reputation and conduct as by 
appearance, "blood," or other presumably scientific evidence.252 Thus, 
courts often called for "reputation evidence," asking witnesses about how 
an individual is received within different "racial" communities, who he 
associates with, and how he is perceived by his neighbors; that is, what he 
247. Okizaki, supra note 32, at 474; Wright, supra note 22, at 524. 
248. See Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial 
Marriage: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 32 AKRON L. REv. 557, 571-72 (1999) (discussing 
Virginia's evolving defmition of who was "White"); see generally de Plevitz & Croft, supra 
note 63 (comparing how Australian law defined Aboriginality). 
249. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 143 (1806) (holding that the appellees, who were of Native 
American descent, were entitled to freedom). 
250. Id. at 139. 
251. Id. at 141. 
252. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 120, 181-85 ( 1998). The cases involved criminal 
prosecutions, inheritance disputes, slaves suing for their freedom, slander claims, and 
slaveholders suing those who allegedly assisted runaway slaves passing as White. Id. at 120-21. 
In each case the "racial" identity of a person was disputed, and a determination of whether the 
person was White or Black was relevant to the outcome of the litigation. Id. 
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"passes" for. 253 In addition, courts often based their determinations on the 
extent to which a person "performed Whiteness."254 Men were judged by 
their exercise of good citizenship, gentlemanlike behavior, and fulfillment 
of obligations in the public sphere, while women were judged by their 
apparent purity and moral virtue.255 
Controversy concerning "racial" determinations continued into the 
twentieth century. In the early 1920s, at the height of the Jim Crow era, the 
Supreme Court decided two citizenship cases in which it reached 
inconsistent conclusions. In Ozawa v. United Statei56 the Court denied 
citizenship to a Japanese applicant because he was not Caucasian/57 and, at 
the time, naturalization rights were limited to Whites and persons of African 
nativity.258 Several months later the Court was faced with a case brought by 
an Asian Indian, who argued that he was eligible for citizenship because he 
was Caucasian.259 In response, the Court promptly revised its definition of 
"White person" to mean whatever is "the understanding of the common 
man."260 The Court's inability to define "racial" status consistently in two 
253. Jd. at 147-51. The author cites Boullemet v. Phillips, No. 4219 (La. New Orleans 
Parish Ct. Feb. 1840), rev'd, 2 Rob. 365 (La. 1842), and Hare v. Board of Education, No. 
17,552 (N.C. Gates Cty. Super. Ct. June 1893), as cases in which reputation evidence was 
sought. See also Wallenstein, supra note 248, at 570-71. 
254. Gross, supra note 252, at 156-57. 
255. ld. 
256. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). 
257. ld. at 197-98. 
258. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
259. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206-10 (1923). In his argument, Thind 
contended that residents of the north and northwest parts of India were members of the Aryan 
"race" because the Aryans conquered the aborigines oflndia around 2000 B.C.E.ld. at 209-10. 
260. ld. at 214. To elucidate its standard, the Court suggested an "astonishment" test and an 
"assimilation" test. Scales-Trent, supra note 9, at 288-89. These are described in the following 
passages: 
It may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a 
common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows 
perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between 
them to-day [sic] .... We venture to think that the average well-informed 
white American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the race 
to which he belongs is made up of such heterogeneous elements. 
Thind, 261 U.S. at 209, 211. 
The children of English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other 
Europe parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the 
distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. On the other hand, it cannot 
be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents would 
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry . . . [and] the great 
body of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of 
assimilation. 
Id. at 215. 
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cases brought within a one year period highlights the difficulty of 
constructing "racial" categories within the law. 
One commentator has argued that even at the height of the Jim Crow era, 
the legal community understood "race" to be a social construct.261 
Accordingly, "at the tum of the twentieth century, there was widespread 
discussion of the artificiality of the color line, in courtrooms, legal 
commentary, social science literature, journalism, and fiction."262 More 
recently, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have explicitly 
acknowledged the dubious nature of "racial" categories?63 In attempting to 
determine who is White, who is Black, and who is otherwise non-White, 
both the legislatures and the courts have struggled with the fluidity of 
"racial" categories. Neither institution has succeeded in formulating a 
consistent and reliable methodology for determining "race" identity. 
3. Data Collection and the Census 
The dilemma of delineating "racial" classifications arises in a different 
context in contemporary times, namely, in the effort to collect certain types 
of statistical data. In 1977, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
("OMB") issued Statistical Directive No. 15, entitled "Race and Ethnic 
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting" ("Directive 
15").264 Directive 15 lists the basic "racial" and ethnic categories that the 
federal government is to utilize for purposes of statistical, administrative, 
and civil rights compliance reports. 265 In 1977, the basic categories were: 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, 
Hispanic, and White?66 Directive 15 also allowed agencies to collect data 
261. Sharfstein, supra note 236, at 1476. 
262. !d. 
263. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (discussing 
scientific and anthropological authorities arguing that "race" is a social construct in a case 
holding that individuals of Arab ancestry are protected from "race" discrimination under 42 
U.S.C.A. §1981 (West 2003)); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176 n.l2 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that "the modern usage [of race] may well itself be a fiction, in the sense that it groups 
people into what are no more than socially constructed categories"); Ho ex ref. Ho v. S.F. 
Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that races are not bio1ogically-
defmed groups and that "race is a social construct"). 
264. Office of Management and Budget, Statistical Directive No. 15 (May 12, 1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 Directive 15], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncVRaceRpt/appende.htm 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
265. !d.; Omi, supra note 211, at 10. 
266. 1977 Directive 15, supra note 264. More specifically, the categories were defined as 
follows: 
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separately for "race" and "ethnicity"267 if they preferred to do so, 
designating "Hispanic origin" and "not of Hispanic origin" as ethnic 
classifications and all other categories as "racial" ones. 
Directive IS's classifications, however, were criticized as being severely 
flawed and inconsistent.268 For example, "Black" was the only group 
defined by reference to "race," whereas "Hispanic" was defmed by 
reference to national origin.269 "Asian or Pacific Islander" and "White" were 
characterized by geographic origin, while categorization as "American 
Indian or Alaskan Native" was appropriate only for those who maintain 
cultural identification with the community.270 In addition, some believed 
that the categories were unscientific and insufficiently comprehensive, since 
none covered groups such as the original South American Indian population 
or Australian Aborigines.271 
In response to these criticisms, Directive 15 was amended in 1997, in 
advance of the 2000 census.272 The categories were changed to the 
following: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African 
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native. A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of North America, and who maintains cultural identification 
through tribal affiliation or community recognition. 
b. Asian or Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of the original 
peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the 
Pacific Islands. This area includes, for example, China, India, Japan, Korea, 
the Philippine Islands, and Samoa. 
c. Black. A person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa. 
d. Hispanic. A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South 
American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. 
e. White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, 
North Africa, or the Middle East. 
267. For a discussion of whether the two terms have different meanings and of how 
"ethnicity" might be defined, see inji-a Part IV.B.2. 
268. Omi, supra note 211, at 12. 
269. 1977 Directive 15, supra note 264. 
270. !d.; Omi, supra note 211, at 11. 
271. Office of Management and Budget, Standards for the Classification of Federal Data 
on Race and Ethnicity (June 9, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Revisions to Directive 15] (detailing 
various criticism and suggested changes for Directive 15), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/notice_l5.htrnl (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). South American 
Indians are, by definition, excluded from the category of "American Indian or Alaskan Native." 
However, South American Indians also are not Asian or Pacific Islanders, Blacks, Hispanics, or 
Whites, as those terms are defmed. Australian Aborigines are black in skin tone, but are not 
natives of Africa. See de Plevitz & Croft, supra note 63, at 109 (explaining that Aborigines 
descend from the earliest inhabitants of Australia). 
272. Office of Management and Budget, Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of 
Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58782 (proposed Oct. 30, 1997) [hereinafter 
1997 Revisions to Directive 15], . available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/ 
1997standards.htrnl (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
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American, Hispanic or Latino, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 
and White.273 
The history of the census, which predates Directive 15 by almost two 
centuries,274 provides a particularly stark illustration of the inconsistent and 
ever-evolving treatment of "racial" categories by American legal and public 
policy authorities.275 Since 1900, at least twenty-six different "race" -related 
terms have been utilized to categorize the U.S. population.276 The 1820 
census was the first to utilize the word "color," which referred to non-White 
slaves that had been freed. 277 In 1850, the term "color" was also applied to 
Whites.278 The word "race" was introduced in 1870 with the choices of 
white, colored, Chinese, and Indian.279 The next census added Japanese as a 
subcategory, while subsequent censuses shifted and interchanged the terms 
"color" and "race" as well as "Negro," "colored," "Black," and 
!d. 
273. !d. The "Categories and Definitions" section currently reads: 
--American Indian or Alaska Native. A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of North and South America (including Central America), 
and who maintains tribal affiliation or community attachment. 
-- Asian. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far 
East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, 
Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine 
Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
-- Black or African American. A person having origins in any of the black 
racial groups of Africa. Terms such as "Haitian" or "Negro" can be used in 
addition to "Black or African American." 
-- Hispanic or Latino. A person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban 
[sic], South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, 
regardless of race. The tenn, "Spanish origin," can be used in addition to 
"Hispanic or Latino." 
-- Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any 
of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. 
-- White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, 
the Middle East, or North Africa. 
The 1997 Revisions to Directive 15 still allow agencies to collect data separately for 
"ethnicity," designating "Hispanic or Latino" and "Not Hispanic or Latino" as ethnic categories. 
274. The first census was taken in 1790. YANOW, supra note 26, at 55. The census is now 
governed by 1977 Directive 15, but the Directive provides only minimum categories for data 
collection. 1997 Directive 15, supra note 272. 
275. For a general history of the census, see MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: 
A SOCIAL HISTORY (1988) and THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS (William Alonso & Paul Starr eds., 
1987). See also NOBLES, supra note 245, at 25-84. Nobles's book argues that "census bureaus 
are political actors that help to make race a political reality and do not simply count by it." !d. at 
22. 
276. AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 34. 
277. Y ANOW, supra note 26, at 55. 
278. !d. 
279. !d. at 56. 
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"Mulatto."280 In the twentieth century, new subcategories were added in 
rapid succession: Mexican and Philipino (1930); Hindu, Korean, and "all 
other" (1940); American Indian instead of Indian (1950); Hawaiian (1960); 
and Eskimo, Aleut, Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Samoan, and Guamanian 
(1980).281 In 2000, respondents could choose from the following "racial" 
categories: "White," "Black, African Am., or Negro," "Asian Indian," 
"Chinese," "Filipino," "Japanese," "Korean," "Vietnamese," ''Native 
Hawaiian," "Guamanian or Chamorro," "Samoan," "Other Pacific 
Islander," "Other Asian," and "Some other race."282 Thus, since its 
inception, the census has utilized "racial" categories that have been based 
on an admixture of concepts including color (White or Black), national 
origin (e.g., Korean), state of origin (e.g., Hawaiian), and even religion 
(e.g., Hindu). 
The characterization of certain subgroups within the population has been 
particularly challenging for those designing the census. One example is the 
treatment of Hispanic individuals.283 "Hispanic" is not considered a "race" 
for purposes of the census,284 so Hispanics must choose one of the "racial" 
categories listed above by which to identify themselves.285 However, the 
census asks a separate question concerning Hispanic identity?86 In 2000, 
respondents were asked if they are "Spanish/Hispanic/Latina" and then 
were required to answer whether they are Mexican, Mexican American, 
Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or members of some other Hispanic sub-
group. Predictably, different terminology has been applied to the category 
of "Hispanic" in different decades. In 1950 and 1960, they were classified 
as "Persons of Spanish Mother Tongue"; in 1970, they were identified as 
those "of both Spanish Surname and Spanish Mother Tongue"; in 1980, 
they were listed as "Hispanics"; in 1990, they were classified as "of 
280. Id. The 1890 census had the following "racial" categories: white, black, Mulatto, 
Quadroon, Octoroon, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian. In 1900, Mulatto, Quadroon, and Octoroon 
disappeared, but Mulatto was utilized again in 1910 and 1920. Fukurai, supra note 30, at 28. 
281. Fukurai, supra note 30, at 27. Hindu and Korean were eliminated in 1950, but Korean 
returned in 1970. !d. at 27-28. 
282. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/ 
main/www/cen2000.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter 2000 Census]. 
283. For a discussion of Hispanic ethnicity, see generally FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA 
TIENDA, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 7-35 (1987) (discussing the 
extremely varied demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of those with Spanish origin). 
284. 2000 Census, supra note 282; U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 1990 Form 
[hereinafter 1990 Census Form]. 
285. See Mireya Navarro, Going Beyond Black and White, Hispanics in Census Pick 
'Other,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 1, 21 (reporting that in the 2000 census, forty-eight 
percent of Hispanics identified themselves as white, two percent chose Black, and forty-two 
percent marked "some other race" as their response). 
286. 1990 Census Form, supra note 284; 2000 Census, supra note 282. 
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Spanish/Hispanic origin"; and the 2000 census added the term of 
"Latino. "287 These different designations indicate that over the years, 
Hispanics have been identified alternatively as a linguistic group, a national 
group, and a continental group.288 
The categorization of people of mixed "race" has also been especially 
troubling for the Census Bureau. Until 1980, "multiracial" individuals were 
required to identify themselves by the "race" of their non-White parent.289 In 
1990, those who wrote "Black-White" in response to the inquiry about 
"race" were identified as Black, and those who wrote "White-Black" were 
classified as White.290 The 2000 census finally included the option of self-
identification by more than one "race"291 and, therefore, belatedly 
abandoned the notion of "racial" purity and acknowledged the fungible 
nature of "racial" boundaries. Approximately six million Americans chose 
two or more "races" by which to describe themselves. 292 
The census has perpetually adjusted and reshuffled its "racial" 
categories, which have, at different times, encompassed identification 
according to color, national origin, continent of origin, and other 
designations. This phenomenon highlights the fact that the American legal 
system has no fixed, uniform definition of the term "race" or mechanisms 
by which to identify membership in particular "racial" groups. 
IV. ABANDONING "RACE" AND REFORMING THE LAW 
A. Reasons for Discontinuing the Use of "Race" as a Legal Concept 
We return now to the question posed at the beginning of this article. As 
noted, the term "race" appears in hundreds of contemporary federal and 
287. Y ANOW, supra note 26, at 57; 1990 Census Form, supra note 284; 2000 Census, supra 
note 282. 
288. For a discussion of Hispanics as a "racial" group, see Gaines, supra note 31, at 2193 
(stating that Hispanics descend from western Europeans, Native Americans, and West Africans, 
and therefore they are not a biologically distinct "racial" group). The author states that the 
concept of a Hispanic "race" emerged only in the early 1980s. !d. at 2193. 
289. Scales-Trent, supra note 9, at 285. 
290. !d. 
291. Y ANOW, supra note 26, at 72. Some advocates suggested that a "multiracial" category 
be added to the census. However, many civil rights organizations opposed the proposal because 
of concern that such a category would reduce the number of people considered to be members 
of particular "races" and because it might have generated controversy regarding the protected 
status ofvarious groups. 1994 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 271; Omi, supra note 211, 
at 18. 
292. Begley, supra note 33, at Bl. 
36:1093] IS THERE A PLACE FOR "RACE"? 1137 
state statutes, 293 sometimes alone294 and sometimes juxtaposed to related 
terms, such as "color" and "national origin. "295 If the social sciences, 
medical sciences, and the law can offer no reliable definition •of the word, 
what does "race" mean in the law? How does "race" differ from "color" and 
"national origin"? The answer is that the concept's meaning is entirely 
unclear. 
"Race," however, is not merely vague or incoherent, but worse, is a 
pernicious concept. Notions of "race," reinforced by legal mandates, have 
historically engendered the belief that human beings are divided into well-
defined subspecies, some of which are superior to others.296 This 
misconception has led to the oppression, subjugation, and even 
extennination of millions of people. 297 This part will construct the argument 
that the law should discontinue use of the term "race" for a number of 
reasons. First, the law has an expressive function, a power to shape public 
perception and ideology,298 and, therefore, it must not reinforce fallacies 
about human groups. Second, the use of "race" tenninology and 
categorization results in a number of tangible harms. 
It must be emphasized that this article does not argue that individuals 
should stop identifying themselves as African-American, Jewish, Hispanic, 
etc. On the contrary, these identities are often central to the self-
understanding and self-image of many individuals.299 They provide people 
with a sense of community, common experience, and "linked fate."300 They 
can also inspire minority members to nurture their cultural heritage and to 
293. See discussion supra Part II.B-C. 
294. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (2000) (stating that students are entitled to equal 
educational opportunities regardless of their "race"); 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(l)-(2) (2000) 
(providing that the "race" of an offender not be a factor in death sentencing). 
295. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2000) (establishing that it is unlawful for creditors to 
discriminate against any applicant "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or 
marital status, or age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination 
based on "race," color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
296. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group 
Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1455, 1461 (2002) (discussing the theory that "race 
consciousness breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and helplessness among persons of 
color"); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Review Essay: Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 747, 759 (1994) (noting that physical traits are often associated with moral characteristics). 
297. AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 34 (referring to "the Holocaust, 
slavery, and the extirpation of American Indian populations"). 
298. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 
349, 350-51, 394 (1997) (arguing that criminal laws express shared values and influence 
people's understanding of each other's beliefs). 
299. Lopez, supra note 34, at 61. 
300. Rogers M. Smith, Black and White After Brown: Constructions of Race in Modem 
Supreme Court Decisions, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 709,711 (2003) (noting that "race" identity is 
also often the basis for cultural expression and political action). 
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galvanize support for political action to redress past wrongs.301 I argue only 
that being African-American, White, Jewish, or Hispanic should be 
understood as something other than membership in a "race." 
1. The Expressive Power of the Law 
In addition to controlling human behavior through rules and sanctions, 
the law has symbolic meaning and conveys social messages. 302 Revisions in 
the law can induce people to change their fundamental beliefs, at least in 
part because human beings crave social approval and thus strive to conform 
to public norms.303 The public statements made by the law can, therefore, be 
even more powerful than its threat of sanctions in influencing behavior.304 
Some scholars refer to this phenomenon as the "expressive" function or 
power of the law.305 
Consequently, for example, environmental protection laws can mold 
human attitudes towards natural resources.306 Laws that prohibit littering can 
shape human behavior even if they are not accompanied by vigorous 
enforcement activity.307 Similarly, statutes governing cigarette smoking in 
public places, alcohol consumption by minors, and seatbelt use can shift 
societal norms and promote social advancement through their symbolic 
power.3o8 
At the same time, governmental action can produce expressive harms, 
that is, injuries caused by the messages conveyed through governmental 
301. Lisa K. Pomeroy, Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Controversy over 
Race Categorization and the 2000 Census, 32 U. ToL. L. REv. 67, 81 (2000). 
302. Sunstein, supra note 41, at2024. 
303. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal The01y of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 
340, 359, 369-71 (2000) (discussing incentives provided by the law that are associated with 
people's desire for social approval). 
304. Dan M. Kahan, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 615 (1998) ("That people care intensely about what laws express is 
confirmed by the tremendous political salience of capital punishment, flag desecration, and 
other criminal-law issues that have only trivial or ambiguous regulatory significance."); Richard 
H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1650-51 (2000) 
(stating "that law influences behavior independent of the sanctions it threatens to impose, that 
law works by what it says in addition to what it does"). 
305. See Kahan, supra note 304, at 615 (speaking of the "expressive rationality of criminal 
law"); Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 46, at 399 (explaining the view that "laws and legal 
actors can send stigmatizing messages that result in concrete harms separate and apart from any 
denial of government benefits"); McAdams, supra note 304, at 1650 (stating that law has both a 
punitive and an "expressive" function). 
306. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2024. 
307. I d. at 2032. 
308. See id. at 2052. 
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actions. Such harms have been found to rise to the level of constitutional 
violations309 even if no individual has suffered specific damages, and the 
harm is purely social.31° Commentators point out, for example, that the First 
Amendment's ban of governmental "endorsement" ofreligion311 is largely a 
prohibition of expressive harms. 312 According to Justice O'Connor, the 
wrong committed when a state endorses religion is that it "sends a message 
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders .... "313 
Within the last decade, the Supreme Court has signaled that expressive 
harms can also constitute Equal Protection violations. In Shaw v. Reno314 
and Miller v. Johnson,315 the Court invalidated redistricting legislation in 
North Carolina and Georgia without finding that they resulted in vote 
dilution meant to minimize the voting power of minorities.316 Rather, the 
plans were condemned because they reinforced "racial stereotypes" and 
communicated to "elected officials that they represent a particular racial 
group rather than their constituency as a whole."317 
By extension, the terminology that the law utilizes in classifying 
particular populations can have significant implications. As previously 
discussed, notions of "race," reinforced by legal mandates, have historically 
engendered the belief that human beings are divided into subspecies, some 
of which are superior to others.318 This misconception has led to countless 
human rights violations.319 Still today some individuals are developing so-
called "scientific" evidence concerning the moral and intellectual 
309. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizan·e Districts, " and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 
483, 506-07 (1993). 
310. Id. at 507-08. 
311. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987). 
312. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 309, at 512. 
313. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
314. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
315. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
316. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652. 
317. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650. 
318. Hutchinson, supra note 296, at 1461 (discussing the theory that "race consciousness 
breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and helplessness among persons of color"); Chong-
Soon Lee, supra note 296, at 759 (noting that physical traits are often associated with moral 
characteristics). 
319. AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 34 (referring to "the Holocaust, 
slavery, and the extirpation of American Indian populations"). 
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deficiencies of particular "racial" groups in order to advance political 
agendas.320 
The law, particularly in the civil rights arena, where the term "race" is 
frequently used, should spearhead the effort to combat these fallacies. The 
law should not continue to reizy "race" by giving it a legitimacy it does not 
otherwise have. By discontinuing utilization of the term, the law can make a 
powerful statement that the concept of "race" is a fiction and that there are 
no superior and inferior human subspecies. If the law limits its vocabulary 
to more precise terminology such as "color," "national origin," or 
"continent of origin," it will teach that populations are distinguishable only 
in terms of superficial characteristics such as skin color or birthplace. It will 
further elucidate that those who discriminate rely only on these superficial 
attributes to identifY their targets and that discrimination is not justified by 
any deeper, essentialist qualities that characterize members of particular 
"races." Abandonment of the term "race," therefore, would strike a blow 
against the ignorance that supports intolerance and prejudice. 
While for the last forty years "race" has been used in the law in order to 
protect and benefit minority groups, there is no guarantee that American 
law will never again authorize the marginalization of certain segments of 
the population. The more progressive attitudes of today potentially could be 
a deviation from the norm rather than a lasting phenomenon. 
Continued belief in "race" as biology will reinforce notions of particular 
groups as naturally less intelligenf21 or more prone to violence or criminal 
activity than others.322 These beliefs can lead to various forms of 
discrimination in areas such as employment, insurance, and racial 
profiling.323 If the law does not reject the notion that human beings can be 
320. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing THE BELL CURVE WARS, supra note 227, and the 
theory that Blacks are intellectually and morally inferior to Whites). 
321. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
322. See Carter, supra note 2, at 18-19 (discussing the controversial nature of the 
contention that crime rates are "racially" disproportionate and evidence that drug use is not 
higher among African-Americans); see also Juan Williams, The Survival of Racism Under the 
Constitution, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 7, 16-17 (1992). The article reports the results of a 1990 
survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, which 
included Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, represented in proportion to their percentage of 
the American population. The survey respondents indicated that "62% thought blacks more 
likely to be lazy; 56% said blacks were more prone to violence; 53% said the black population 
is less intelligent" and 78% thought that African-Americans "are more likely than whites to 
'prefer to live off welfare."' !d. 
323. !d.; see also Bill Dedman, Racial Profiling is Confirmed: Police Face New Rules on 
Stopping Motorists, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2004, at B 1 (reporting the results of a study 
conducted by Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice that found that in nearly 
three quarters of the communities tested in Massachusetts, the police departments were guilty of 
racial profiling against minority drivers). 
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classified by "races," it is not unfathomable that we would see a return to 
the familiar practices of governmentally sanctioned discrimination against 
particular minorities because of their imagined "racial" characteristics. 
2. Other Tangible Harms 
Admittedly, use of the term "race" does not commonly cause 
jurisprudential confusion or generate unjust case outcomes. Most often, 
"race" is linked in the public mind with obvious physical traits such as skin 
color, and thus, there is little controversy as to whether a civil rights litigant 
is a member of a particular "race" or whether "race" discrimination theory 
applies to a specific case. On rare occasions, however, the courts have had 
to grapple with the issue of whether minorities such as Jews or Arabs are 
"races" and thus protected against "race" discrimination.324 These 
controversies would be eliminated if "race" were no longer the focus of 
legal inquiry. 
In addition, the incoherence of the term "race" and the misconception 
that "race" is a biological category result in significant social harms. The 
growing population of individuals of mixed "racial" backgrounds makes the 
question of "race" identity in American society increasingly complex and 
the idea that there are fixed "racial" categories increasingly outdated.325 
Individuals of "multiracial" background may feel disenfranchised by the 
American focus on identifYing people by "race" and focusing on "racial" 
diversity or discrimination.326 Since these individuals have no single "race," 
it is particularly problematic to apply the term to them, and reference to 
their color, national origin, or continent of origin is far more sensible. 
A shift away from the concept of "race" and a refocusing on more 
meaningful te1ms might also advance social, political, and scientific 
discourse in a variety of arenas. For example, in speaking of "racial" 
diversity for affirmative action and other purposes, it is often unclear what 
324. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (finding that 
Congress intended to protect Jews against official and private "racially" discriminatory 
interference with property rights pursuant to civil rights law); Saint Francis Coli. v. Al-Khazraji, 
481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that those of Arab descent are protected against "racial" 
discrimination under civil rights law); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176-79 (2d Cir. 
2002) (discussing whether Jews constitute a "race" for purposes of Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
325. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. According to the 1990 census, two million 
children younger than eighteen had parents who were of different "races." Omi, supra note 211, 
at 18. In addition, over six million individuals described themselves as members of two or more 
"races" in the 2000 census. Begley, supra note 33, at Bl. 
326. See supra Part Ill.C.3 (discussing debates concerning how the 2000 census should 
address individuals of multiracial background). 
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type of diversity is actually sought. Is it skin color diversity, viewpoint 
diversity, background diversity, economic status diversity, or something 
else?327 Any one of these might be legitimate, but they are all subsumed and 
obfuscated by the term "race." The complexity of the diversity question was 
demonstrated by the nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas. Prior to his 
appointment, many agreed that an African-American should be selected to 
replace Justice Marshall.328 However, some believed that Thomas would not 
contribute the appropriate "racial" diversity because of his conservative 
outlook.329 "Racial" diversity was obviously not synonymous with color 
diversity for these advocates, but rather, seemed to be a veiled demand for 
the appointment of an African-American person with a particular political 
viewpoint. Abandoning the incoherent term "race" might force American 
decisionmakers to think more clearly about their goals and promote more 
explicit and candid public discussion. 
To the extent that medical science is increasingly interested in "racially" 
tailored research and treatment/30 it is important that scientists remain wary 
and cognizant of the dangers of focusing on "race" in the medical arena.m 
As previously discussed, "race" cannot be perceived as biology and cannot 
be linked too closely with health conditions.332 In designing clinical trials 
327. See supra note 49; see also McGowan, supra note 30, at 245 (arguing that it is 
inappropriate for diversity programs to use "race or ethnicity as proxies for diversity of social 
experience and social affiliation"). 
328. Richard J. Cattani, Diversity on the Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 17, 
1991, at 18. 
329. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas ji-om a 
Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005 (1991) (discussing the author's concerns 
about Thomas's appointment to the Supreme Court); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice 
Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407 (1994) (stating that the National 
Bar Association, an organization of African-American lawyers, voted to oppose Thomas's 
nomination, with 128 members opposing the nomination, 124 supporting it, and 31 taking no 
position); Cattani, supra note 328, at 18 (stating that some viewed Thomas as a "conservative 
Reagan/Bush white jurist in black skin"); Christopher Edley, Jr., Straight Talk on the Quota 
Candidate ... Neither Liberals nor Conservatives Can, in Good Conscience, Support Thomas, 
ST. LoUis PosT-DISPATCH, July 14, 1991, at 3B (stating that opponents of affirmative action 
should oppose the Thomas nomination because his selection can be explained only by his color, 
and supporters of affirmative action should oppose him because of his political outlook); Rance 
Thomas, A Step Backward on Civil Rights: Thomas' Record Shows Little Sympathy for 
Society's Disadvantaged, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1991, at 3G (arguing that 
President Bush should withdraw the nomination of Judge Thomas and, instead, "nominate an 
African-American who has demonstrated a strong commitment to civil, individual and women's 
rights"). 
330. See supra notes 175-178, 185-190 and accompanying text. 
331. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 46, at 395 (arguing that "racial profiling" should 
be allowed in medicine only under very limited circumstances). 
332. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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and treatments, medical professionals must remain mindful of the mixed 
"racial" origins of so many Americans and of the diverse populations 
affected by "racial" diseases such as Tay-Sachs and sickle cell anemia.333 
Incorrect correlation of illnesses with a single "race" could result in 
misdiagnoses by medical professionals.334 Doctors may miss the presence of 
sickle cell anemia in individuals who are of mixed race because they do not 
look classically Black and are not perceived as candidates for the disease. 
Similarly, people of Greek, Italian, or Arab extraction, who are also 
vulnerable to sickle cell anemia, may receive erroneous diagnoses because 
they look White, and medical professionals do not think of testing them for 
this illness. 
Racial profiling in medicine can also lead to· employment discrimination, 
insurance discrimination, and other forms of discrimination by those who 
assume that members of a particular minority are more likely to become ill 
than others.335 For example, genetic research concerning breast cancer and 
individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish descent has led to concerns about 
stigmatization of Jews as prone to develop cancer and a reinforcement of 
the idea that they are a "racially" distinct group.336 Similarly, in several 
cases, African-Americanemployees or military personnel have been singled 
out for sickle cell anemia testing even though no other at-risk groups were 
screened for that condition or for other diseases.337 
Finally, an overemphasis on the biological components of health 
disparities rather than social and environmental factors can lead to a 
misallocation of resources. To illustrate, according to many experts, "racial" 
differences in hypertension are linked not necessarily to biological factors, 
but to diet, environment, exercise, and stress.338 While developing "race-
333. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text. 
334. See Richard S. Garcia, The Misuse of Race in Medical Diagnosis, C!-IRON. HIGHER 
Enuc., May 9, 2003, at B15 (relating the story of an African-American girl whose cystic 
fibrosis was not diagnosed until she reached the age of eight because the disease is much more 
common among Whites than among Blacks and thus her doctors overlooked its possibility in 
her case). 
335. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1272 (9th Cir. 
1998) (finding that African-American employees could bring a cause of action under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against an employer who tested their blood samples for the 
sickle cell trait); Kahn, supra note 182, at 40. 
336. Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. 
REv. 7 55, 757 (2000) (discussing concerns that new genetic technology poses significant 
dangers of "discrimination and stigmatization" to Jewish communities and others); Kahn, supra 
note 50, at 479. 
337. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272; Kahn, supra note 182, at 41 (relating that the 
U.S. Air Force screened Blacks to determine if they were sickle cell carriers). 
338. Kahn, supra note 50, at 480; see also supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text. 
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specific" drugs might be useful,339 resources should not be shifted away 
from other initiatives aimed at diminishing socioeconomic injustices, since 
these could be even more effective in enhancing the health status of 
minorities.340 An excessive reliance on "racial" categorization could thus 
compromise public health and welfare. 
B. Possible Approaches 
Discrimination, unfortunately, is still a fact of life in American society.341 
Therefore, we cannot simply eradicate the term "race" from the legal 
lexicon by eliminating all anti-discrimination laws. To the contrary, we 
must continue to address problems of inequity and provide protection to 
vulnerable groups, but we must do so in a more sensitive way that 
undermines rather than reinforces prejudices and misconceptions. It is for 
this reason that we must substitute other terms for the word "race." 
Changes in legal and social terminology in the civil rights arena are not 
unprecedented. In a matter of decades, the American public has altered its 
vocabulary several times, switching from "Negro" to "Colored" to "Black" 
to "Afro-American" and finally, to "African-American."342 These changes 
from a "racial" term to a color term to a geographic origin term seem to 
acknowledge the power of language. An integral part of American society's 
shift in consciousness and effort to promote the civil rights of this minority 
group has been a change in the word by which it is identified. 
In a different statutory context, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 's343 anti-
discrimination mandate originally referred to "handicapped person. "344 By 
339. Kahn, supra note 50, at 474-75 (discussing the development of BiDil®, a drug 
designed specifically to treat African-Americans with heart failure). 
340. Kahn, supra note 182, at 41-42; Sankar et al., supra note 180, at 2987-88 (discussing 
the pitfalls of focusing excessively on genetic factors as the cause of health disparities). 
341. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reports that in fiscal year 
2003 it received 28,526 charges of race discrimination in employment. U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, RACE-BASED CHARGES: FY 1992-FY 2003, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). 
342. Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and 
Manners, 63 TENN. L. REv. 689, 693 (1996) (noting that all these changes took place within less 
than fifty years). 
343. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-724 (1998). 
344. See Timothy G. Church & James R. Neumeister, University Control of Student-
Athletes with Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, 
25 J.C. & U.L. 105, 117 n.80 (1998) (noting that, in 1992, Congress amended the Rehabilitation 
Act to substitute the word "disability" for the word "handicap" pursuant to Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(p)(32), 106 Stat. 1992); Hoffman, supra note 
23, at 1229 (discussing the Rehabilitation Act's original definition of "handicapped 
individual"). 
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1990, however, it was felt that "individual with a disability" is the more 
sensitive and appropriate term, and thus, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990345 adopted this new language,346 and the Rehabilitation Act was 
also revised accordingly.347 Decades earlier, Pennsylvania chose to 
eliminate the term "retarded child" from its statutes and replaced it with 
"exceptional child. "348 
Similarly, the legal community in particular and the public at large 
should abandon the term "race."349 While legislatures may be loathe to 
revisit and amend hundreds of existing statutes solely for the purpose of 
redacting the word "race," doing so would not be impossible. As discussed 
above, statutory terminology has previously been changed in more limited 
contexts.350 A recent development in Rwanda, a country historically plagued 
by ethnic hatred and massacres, is particularly powerful. In the spring of 
2004, the New York Times reported that Rwanda has outlawed the concept 
of ethnicity.351 Ethnicity is no longer mentioned in schoolbooks, the media, 
or government identity cards, and the new crime of "divisionism" includes 
speaking provocatively about ethnicity.352 
Nevertheless, even if legislatures refuse to amend all federal and state 
statutes that currently feature the word "race,"353 the proposal outlined 
345. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
346. Cheryl L. Anderson, "Desen1ing Disabilities": Why the Definition of Disability Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation 
Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REv. 83, 87-88 (2000) (stating that the new vocabulary reflects a 
change in attitude about people with disabilities); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, 
and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People 
with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.2 (1993) (explaining that, within the disability 
community, "[t]he term 'disability' is preferred over the term 'handicap' because the 
community bas developed a defmitional distinction between the two words: a disability is a 
physical or mental condition of an individual, whereas a handicap is a restriction placed on 
one's ability to function in the external environment"). 
347. Church & Neumeister, supra note 344, at 117 n.80; see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C) 
(1998) (referring to the term "individual with a disability"). 
348. David T. Link, Law Searching by Computer, in AUTOMATED L. REs. 3, 5-6 (Ronald 
A. May ed., 1973). 
349. This change is somewhat more conceptual than the examples provided above, but the 
shift from "Negro" to "African-American" and from "handicapped" to "individual with a 
disability" illustrate that the public mind can adapt to new terminology. Thus, there is hope that 
the American community can stop speaking of "race" and speak instead of "color," "national 
origin," etc. 
350. See notes 343-348 and accompanying text. 
351. Marc Lacey, A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
9, 2004, at A3. 
352. Jd. 
353. Whether or not this is done, the proposal would not require a constitutional 
amendment to revise the Fifteenth Amendment. Because of its historical context and value, this 
amendment could retain its existing language. 
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below should at least apply to future legislative drafting.354 The task of 
determining which words are appropriate substitutes for "race," however, is 
itself challenging. Several alternatives for legislative reform are considered 
and evaluated below. 
1. Redaction of the Term "Race" from All Legislation Without 
Further Statutory Revision 
For statutes that list "race" among several other protected classifications, 
one alternative is to eliminate the word "race" and retain only the more 
precise terms of "color" and "national origin."355 Thus, for example, Title 
VII would provide that it is unlawful for employers to engage in 
discrimination because of an "individual's color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. "356 
The shortcoming of this approach is that the tenns "color" and "national 
origin" do not capture all aspects of "race" that are relevant for legislative 
purposes. The term "color" expresses most closely the obvious identifying 
trait of what we popularly think of as "race." However, there may be 
individuals who look White but are subjected to discrimination because it is 
known that they have Black parents or grandparents. These individuals 
might suffer not because of their color, but because of their ancestry. In 
addition, a prohibition of color discrimination would not cover individuals 
of Hispanic or Jewish origin, who are often indistinguishable from non-
Hispanics and non-Jews by the hue of their skin.357 
354. By "future legislative drafting," I mean both the passage of new laws and amendment 
of existing statutes. If current laws are amended for any reason, "race" terminology could be 
revised in the process of making other changes. 
If existing statutes are amended in the future to eliminate "race," then "race" terminology in 
case law precedent would not correspond to the new wording of the law. Courts applying 
precedent that uses the "race" concept would have to substitute the new statutory terms, e.g., 
color, continent of origin, etc., when drafting their opinions. Similarly, if the law were to 
abandon the "race" concept, the Supreme Court would have to elucidate what is meant by 
"race" in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence since it would no longer be appropriate to speak 
of "race" discrimination in the equal protection context. Instead, cases would be brought for 
color discrimination, national origin discrimination, etc. To the extent it has not already 
sufficiently done so, the Court would have to determine whether and under what circumstances 
strict scrutiny should apply to classification by color, continent of origin, national origin, and 
other related categories. 
355. For a discussion of contemporary federal and state statutes that address "race" issues, 
see supra Part II.B-C. 
356. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). 
357. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" 
Discrimination under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 839 (1994) (noting that "Jews 
are identical to non-Jews in virtually every physical aspect"). 
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"National origin" is defmed as the nation or country of one's birth or the 
country of birth of one's ancestors.358 The prohibition of national origin 
discrimination thus covers discrimination against individuals because they 
are Mexican, Cuban, or Italian. The courts have also extended the concept 
of "national origin" to apply to some populations, such as Gypsies and 
Acadians, who live in particular geographic regions but have no country of 
their own.359 
Nevertheless, "national origin" does not extend to many other 
circumstances in which the country of one's origin is not at issue. For 
example, light skinned individuals who have an African-American ancestor 
or atheists who have Jewish ancestry are not covered by the "national 
origin" concept. In addition, they do not fall under the "color" or "religion" 
classifications, since they look White and are not subjected to 
discrimination because of their religious beliefs. Without additional 
terminology to expand the statutory scope, these individuals, therefore, 
would be vulnerable to discrimination as they would be excluded from all 
of Title VII's protected classes. 
In addition, some people are denied opportunities for which they are 
qualified not because of their color or national origin per se, but because of 
expressions of their national or color identities.36° For example, some 
African-Americans might wear dreadlocks361 or speak Ebonics/62 and 
Hispanics might speak English with a foreign accent.363 To the extent that 
358. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973) (quoting 110 CoNG. REc. 2549 
(1964) (recording Congressman Roosevelt's statement that national origin "means the country 
from which you or your forebears came .... You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
England, France or any other country")). 
359. See Janko v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531, 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989); 
Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980) 
(holding that Gypsies and Acadians, respectively, can claim protected status under Title VII's 
"national origin" classification). 
360. See Perea, supra note 357, at 853 (stating that most discrimination against Hispanics 
"occurs because of ethnic traits" rather than national origin). 
361. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F .. Supp. 229, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(upholding the dismissal of a receptionist because she wore her hair in cornrows in violation of 
the airline's dress code). 
362. Ebonies is also known as African-American Vernacular English. CENTER FOR APPLIED 
LINGUlSTICS, CAL STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA ON EBONICS (1997), available at 
www.cal.org/ebonics/ebcal.htrnl (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). 
363. The courts have issued inconsistent decisions concerning whether discrimination based 
on accent creates a cause of action for national origin discrimination. See Carino v. Univ. of 
Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (lOth Cir. 1984) (holding that an employer had 
violated Title VII by demoting an employee born in the Philippines because of his accent); 
Xieng v. Peoples Nat'! Bank of Wash., 844 P.2d 389, 391-92 (Wash. 1993) (en bane) (fmding 
that an employer engaged in national origin discrimination, in violation of state law, when it 
refused to promote an employee because of his accent, even though the accent did not interfere 
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we wish to proscribe such discrimination, we would fail to do so if statutes 
such as Title VII extended only to the categories of color and national 
origin.364 Simply eliminating the term "race" from legislative texts without 
further statutory revision, therefore, is not an optimal response to the 
vagueness of the "race" concept. 
2. Elimination of the Word "Race" and Consistent Substitution of 
Another Term in All Statutes 
A second approach is to substitute another word for the term "race" in all 
statutory provisions addressing "race" issues. The challenge is to find a 
word that captures all legally relevant connotations of the word "race," a 
task that is most probably impossible. The terms "color" and "national 
origin" have already been discussed above. 365 Several other candidates are 
analyzed below. 
a. Ethnicity 
In searching for a fitting replacement for the word "race," one might tum 
to "ethnicity."366 Unfortunately, "ethnicity," like "race," has no fixed 
meaning. 367 As discussed above, Directive 15 identifies "ethnicity" 
exclusively in terms of "Hispanic or Latino" and "not Hispanic or 
Latino."368 Ethnic groups have been described as populations "organized 
around an assumption of common cultural origin" or "bound together by 
common ties of race, language, nationality or culture."369 Even more 
with job performance). But see Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 598-99 (9th Cir. 
1989) (ruling against an applicant who was denied employment because of his Filipino accent 
even though he had the highest score among 721 civil service exam takers), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1081 (1990). It should be noted that most courts have found that Title VII is not violated 
when a bilingual employee is forbidden to speak a foreign language at work. Garcia v. Spun 
Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (fmding that an employer did not violate 
Title VII by subjecting bilingual employees to an English-only rule, but denying the employer's 
summary judgment motion with respect to the rule's application to those who spoke no English 
but could, nevertheless, perform their jobs); Perea, supra note 357, at 828. 
364. A Hispanic person's accent is not necessarily related to her specific country of birth 
(e.g., Mexico or Guatemala), but rather, stems from the fact that her mother tongue is Spanish. 
365. See supra Part IV.B.l. 
366. AAA RESPONSE TO OMB DIRECTIVE 15, supra note 34 (recommending that the term 
"race" be phased out and replaced by a more correct phrase such as "ethnic origin"). 
367. Kaplan & Bennett, supra note 168, at 2710 ("Ethnicity means different things in 
different contexts."); Perea, supra note 357, at 833 (noting that ethnicity is difficult to define 
because it represents "a varying mix of different traits"). 
368. 1997 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 272. 
369. Editorial, supra note 30, at 98. 
36:1093] IS THERE A PLACE FOR "RACE"? 1149 
broadly, etbnicity is at times defined by reference to culture, heritage, 
religion, national origin, ancestry, 'shared symbols or values, and common 
language.370 According to one source, "ethnicity" is a positive, 
complimentary designation that applies only to Whites, whereas minorities 
continue to be classified solely by "race," that is, by their visible physical 
characteristic.371 Finally, in some minds, "ethnicity" is simply synonymous 
with "race."372 While the word "etbnicity" arguably captures important 
aspects of group identity that are related to culture and heritage, it is not a 
satisfactory substitute for the word "race." 
b. Continent of Origin 
Contemporary genetic fmdings might lead to the conclusion that 
"continent of origin" is the ideal replacement for "race."373 However, this 
term alone is not appropriate in all circumstances. To illustrate, while 
Australian aborigines are Black in appearance, their continent of origin is 
Australia and not Africa.374 If they are subjected to discrimination, it is 
unlikely to be because they are from the continent of Australia, but rather, 
because of their physical appearance. Hispanics, to the extent that they are 
370. Martin Bernal, Race in History, in GLOBAL CONVULSIONS: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
NATIONALISM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 76 (Winston A. Van Home ed., 1997); 
Kaplan & Bennett, supra note 168, at 2710; Perea, supra note 357, at 833. Another source 
quotes the foiiowing definitions of ethnicity, found in a variety of dictionaries: 
1. Of or pertaining to a social group ... on the basis of complex, often 
variable traits including religious, linguistic, ancestral, or physical 
characteristics. (American Heritage Dictionary 1975, p. 450) 
I a. Of or pertaining to sizable groups of people sharing a common and 
distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage. 
(American Heritage Dictionary 1992, p. 630) 
2. Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological. (Oxford 
English Dictionary I 971, p. 313) 
2a. Pertaining to race; peculiar to a race or nation; ethnological. Also, 
pertaining to or having common racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic 
characteristics .. ; hence (U.S. coiioq), foreign, exotic. (Oxford English 
Dictionary 1991, p. 423) 
3. Of or relating to a religious, racial, national or cultural group. 
(Webster's IT New Riverside University 1984, p. 445) .... 
Y ANOW, supra note 26, at 4 7. 
371. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned 
from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 887,932-36 (1996). 
372. Vilna Bashi, Racial Categories Matter Because Racial Hierarchies Matter: A 
Commentmy, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 959,961 (1998); Kaplan & Bennett, supra note 168, 
at 2710; see also definitions provided supra note 370 (defining ethnicity by reference to "race"). 
373. See supra notes 155-159 and accompanying text. 
374. See 1994 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 271 (noting that none of Directive 15's 
categories cover Australian aborigines). 
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considered a "racial" group, are often marginalized because of their specific 
national identity (e.g., Mexican), their accent, or their speaking Spanish, 
and not because they are of Latin American or European extraction. 375 
In the context of racial profiling and other types of appearance-based 
discrimination, one's "continent of origin" is also irrelevant to the 
perpetrator of the wrong. For example, Blacks from Jamaica or Cuba are 
subjected to racial profiling and other discriminatory practices even though 
their immediate ancestors are not African.376 It is awkward and senseless to 
prohibit "continent of origin profiling," and instead, the focus needs to be 
on avoiding selection based solely on appearance. Likewise, mixed "race" 
individuals might be victimized because they do not look classically 
White, 377 but the wrongdoers might not know whether they are Latinos, 
African-American, or "multiracial," and thus, could deny being motivated 
by the victims' continental links. Prohibiting continent of origin-based 
discrimination alone would not, therefore, effectively combat discrimination 
m many cases. 
Finally, the term "continent of origin" is problematic in light of ancient 
human history. Many scientists believe that human beings originated in 
Africa and that Caucasians are a subset of the population that left Africa and 
walked north, losing their skin pigmentation in order to adjust to colder, less 
sunny climates.378 Aborigines migrated to Australia along the tropics and 
retained more of their physical characteristics.379 Thus, in the most literal 
sense of the phrase, it may well be that the continent of origin of all 
humanity is Africa, and modem references to Africans or African-
Americans necessarily ignore the early history of the human species.380 
375. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1993) (bilingual 
employees disciplined because they spoke Spanish at work); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt 
Co., 990 F.2d 239, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee harassed because he was Mexican); 
Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1989) (applicant denied position 
because of foreign accent); 1997 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 272 (defining "Hispanic 
or Latino" as a "person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, ... South or Central American, or 
other Spanish culture or origin"). 
376. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the 
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1286-87 (1997) (stating that society 
treats dark skinned individuals as "Black" even if they are Latino). 
377. Steven Greenhouse, Going for the Look, but Risking Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2003, at A12 (describing a growing trend in American industry of hiring sales personnel 
based on their attractive physical appearance). 
378. de Plevitz & Croft, supra note 63, at 115-16. But see JAMES SHREEVE, THE 
NEANDERTHAL ENIGMA 73 (1995) (discussing the theory that "the living races of humankind 
came not from Africa but from ancestors who lived in the same regions [as those in which they 
currently live] as much as a million years ago"). 
379. de Plevitz & Croft, supra note 63, at 116. 
380. !d. at 115; see infra Part IV.C.1 for further discussion. 
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c. Ancestry or Descent 
Ancestry can be defined as "family descent or lineage."381 The term 
"ancestry" was initially listed as a separate protected category in an early 
draft of Title VII but was ultimately deleted because it was understood to be 
synonymous with the term "national origin."382 Nevertheless, the term 
"ancestry," read literally, is applicable to some circumstances that are not 
encompassed by the other concepts analyzed thus far. 
For example, some light-skinned individuals might be subjected to 
discrimination because they have an African-American ancestor, even 
though they do not look Black. Discrimination against some people of 
Jewish lineage is another case in point. Judaism is a religion, and is 
generally covered under that term in anti-discrimination statutes.383 
However, historically, individuals of Jewish descent have been persecuted 
even if they did not identify with the Jewish faith or if they had only a 
single Jewish ancestor several generations in the past.384 In their case, 
victimization is linked to their ancestry rather than to any other 
characteristic. 385 
However, by contrast to the other excessively narrow terms discussed in 
this article/86 "ancestry" and "descent," standing alone, are overbroad. 
Prohibiting discrimination based on ancestry or descent could induce people 
to argue that they are entitled to statutory protection because they were born 
into poverty, were born in particular regions of the country, descended from 
leaders of a political party that is now out of favor, or are vulnerable for an 
infinite number of other reasons associated with their parentage. The terms 
"ancestry" or "descent," without further qualification, would not be 
satisfactory replacements for "race." 
381. Perea, supra note 357, at 832. 
382. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973) (citing H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 
804 (1963) and H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 87 (1963)). 
383. See, e.g., Title VII of the CRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting 
employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). 
384. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
385. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Jews are 
considered a "race" under particular civil rights statutes, and therefore, a law prohibiting 
"racially" based violent interference with enjoyment of public facilities applied to Jews). 
386. See supra Part N.B.l-2. 
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C. A More Nuanced Approach: Assessing the Purpose of Each Statute and 
Substituting Appropriate Terminology for the Word "Race" 
The problem with endeavoring to unpack the meaning of "race" is that 
all words and phrases that might define it prove to be ambiguous, 
underinclusive, or overinclusive when they are themselves analyzed. No 
single word effectively communicates all of the different facets of human 
identity for which "race" might stand in different minds.387 Consequently, 
this article recommends that the word "race" be replaced by a series of 
terms appropriate to the statutory context in question. Laws are passed with 
specific aims in mind, in order to solve particular problems/88 and at their 
best, they are neither too narrow nor too broad. In light of the purpose of. 
each law, drafters of civil rights legislation should be required to determine 
their intended subject group with precision and to choose terminology that 
accurately describes it. Several illustrations can elucidate this approach. 
1. Anti-Discrimination Laws 
Elimination of the term "race" is particularly appropriate in the anti-
discrimination context. In truth, discriminators act because of superficial 
traits that seem apparent to them. They discriminate because of color, or 
national origin, or what they believe to be a person's continental or religious 
origins. The term "race" adds nothing to our understanding of the basis for 
discrimination, and it mistakenly suggests that there might be some 
legitimate biological or moral grounds to distinguish among different 
populations. It is more sound to identify the true nature of what we now call 
"racial" discrimination: it is based on nothing more than people's physical 
appearance, where they were born, or who their ancestors were. 
The anti-discrimination laws generally protect individuals against 
discrimination based on immutable characteristics, traits that an individual 
cannot alter.389 "Color" and "national origin" are certainly immutable and, 
387. See supra Part I (providing different meanings of"race"). 
388. See, e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's "Statement of Findings and 
Purpose," 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000), and the Americans with Disabilities Act's "Findings and 
Purpose" 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
389. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1963) (stating that "an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth" generally constitutes the basis for 
identifying a suspect class); Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Unlike 
race, place of birth, or sex, language is not one of those 'immutable characteristic[ s] determined 
solely by the accident of birth' which typically are the basis for finding a suspect class."); 
Jennifer L. Nevins, Getting Dirty: A Litigation Strategy for Challenging Sex Discrimination 
Law by Beginning with Transsexualism, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383, 410-11 
(1998); Perea, supra note 357, at 866-67 (criticizing the requirement of immutability). 
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therefore, would be appropriate replacements for "race" m the anti-
discrimination context. 
"Continent of origin," another immutable factor, should be added to 
protect individuals who are not otherwise covered, such as those who look 
White but have Black ancestors. Although many believe that all human 
beings originated in Africa/90 the term is appropriate as one in a series 
because it would cover anyone who is subjected to discrimination based on 
having ancestors who came from a particular continent in the last few 
centuries. Realistically, Caucasians would not be subjected to 
discrimination based on the theory that their ancestors, early in human 
history, originated in Africa, but they could be covered by the term to the 
extent that they suffer discrimination because of Eastern European or South 
American origins. 
The term "ancestry" alone is too broad/91 but the concept is useful to 
cover individuals who fall into no other classification, such as people who 
do not adhere to the Jewish faith but who have a Jewish parent or 
grandparent and Caucasian Americans who have a Hispanic forefather. 
"Ancestry" or "descent" would be appropriate additions to a list of 
protected classifications if they were qualified and limited to avoid 
overinclusiveness.392 This could be achieved by the following wording: 
"descent from ancestors of a particular color, national origin, or religion." 
If legislators determine that they wish to protect individuals who are 
excluded fi·om opportunities because of their accents, dialects, spoken 
language, or traditional grooming, the term "ethnicity" could be added.393 
The term could encompass individual expression of culture and heritage 
that is not addressed by other terminology. "Ethnicity" itself, however, 
might have to be defined, as its meaning is not self-evident. 394 In the 
alternative, statutes could incorporate the wording of "culture" or "cultural 
expression."· One scholar proposes that "ethnic traits" be added as a 
protected classification to Title VII and be defmed as including but not 
Arguably, religion, a classification protected by Title VII, is not an immutable characteristic 
because people can change it by choice. However, for many, religious beliefs are so deeply held 
that they feel as bound to them as they are to their genders. Furthermore, as a matter of policy 
and in light of the First Amendment, the law could not expect individuals to change their 
religions simply in order to avoid discrimination. 
390. de Plevitz & Croft, supra note 63, at 115-16. 
391. See supra Part N.B.2. 
392. See id. 
393. See Perea, supra note 357, at 861 (proposing that the terms "ancestry" and "ethnic 
traits" be added to Title VII of the CRA). 
394. See supra N.B.2. 
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being limited to "language, accent, surname, and ethnic appearance. "395 This 
definition would considerably broaden the scope of Title VII and would 
contravene existing judicial precedent,396 but it might be appealing to more 
liberal legislators in the future. 
Under my proposal, legislators could eliminate the term "race" from the 
anti-discrimination laws and prohibit discrimination based on "color, 
national origin, continent of origin, or descent from ancestors of a particular 
color, national origin or religion. "397 In specific instances, one or more of 
these terms could be removed, or "ethnicity," "culture," or "cultural 
expression" could be added, depending on the legislative agenda and the 
characteristics that are intended for statutory protection. 398 
Eliminating the term "race" would not make the anti-discrimination 
statutes less inclusive or deprive any currently covered group of statutory 
protection. Individuals who are subjected to discrimination because they are 
White or Black or of mixed origin could sue for discrimination based on 
color, continent of origin, or descent from ancestors of a parti~ular color or 
continent of origin. Latinos could sue for discrimination based on national 
origin or continent of origin. Middle Eastern individuals could sue for 
discrimination based on national origin, color (if they believe they were 
targeted because of dark skin), or religion (if they were victimized because 
of their Muslim beliefs or attire). Jews could sue for religious 
discrimination or for discrimination based on descent from Jewish 
ancestors. Individuals who look White but have African ancestry could sue 
for continent of origin discrimination or discrimination based on African 
ancestry. White South Africans could sue based on national origin, color, or 
continent of origin, depending upon which theory they think is most 
applicable to their case. I can think of no example of an individual who is 
covered by the term "race" who would not also be covered by at least one of 
the more specific terms, "color," "national origin," "continent of origin," or 
"descent from ancestors of a particular color, national origin, or religion." 
395. See Perea, supra note 357, at 861. 
396. See supra notes 361-363. 
397. Religion, sex, age, and disability may also be added as protected classifications if the 
statute is intended to address those types of discrimination. 
398. For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to note that the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination prohibits discrimination "based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin." Egon Schwelb, The International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 1001 
(1966). 
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2. Other Laws 
Racial profiling statutes constitute a simpler example. These laws intend 
to proscribe selection based on physical appearance. 399 While "racial 
profiling" has become a term of art and might be entrenched in the 
American vocabulary, it could more accurately be called "color profiling" 
or "profiling based on appearance associated with national origin." In recent 
years, individuals of Middle Eastern background have been targeted for 
profiling because they appear to originate in particular countries and not 
because they belong to a "race." Prohibitions against racial profiling would 
be equally effective if the term "race" in these laws were replaced by 
"color" and "appearance associated with national origin."400 The more 
subtle matters of continent of origin, ancestry, and cultural heritage need not 
be included in this context because they are not of concern to those stopping 
individuals based on quick visual impressions. 
Hate crime statutes, like anti-discrimination laws, are broad in their 
intended scope of coverage, criminalizing offenses that are motivated by 
any "racial" prejudice or animosity.401 A typical statute establishes that it is 
a crime to injure a person or damage her property because of the victim's 
"actual or perceived race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin."402 
Instead, the language could be refined to include more meaningful and 
accurate terminology: "actual or perceived color, religion, national origin, 
continent of origin, ethnicity, or descent from ancestors of a particular 
color, national origin, or religion." This very inclusive list is appropriate 
399. See supra Part II.C. 
400. Color would clearly apply to African-Americans and individuals who are targeted 
because they look Hispanic or Middle Eastern would be covered by the designation "national 
origin." The law should apply not only to profiling based on correct national origin 
identification, but also to cases in which law enforcement personnel mistakenly believed that an 
individual was of a particular national origin because of stereotypical physical characteristics. If 
legislators wish to prohibit authorities from targeting individuals based on names that are 
associated with particular nationalities (e.g., picking out Arabic sounding names from passenger 
lists), the law could also prohibit all "national origin profiling." 
401. Chorba, supra note 3, at 346-47 (2001) (citing the statutes of all twenty-six states); 
Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homose.x:ual-Advance Defense and Hate Crime Statutes: Their 
Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 629, 644-45 & n.92 (2001) (noting that the 
movement against hate crimes matured in the 1980s, at which time many of the statutes were 
passed, and listing all relevant statutes); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1999); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 53a-181B (1999) (repealed 2000). 
As of 2001, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had laws that enhanced penalties for 
crimes coiillTiitted because of bias or hate. Chorba, supra note 3, at 346-47. Federal law also, 
however, has penalty enhancement provisions. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. For 
updated information concerning hate crimes statutes, see www.partnersagainsthate.org/ 
hate_response_database/laws search.cfm (last visited Oct. 13. 2004). 
402. COLO. REv. STAT. f18-9-121(1)-(2) (2002). 
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since individuals might be victimized not only because of their color or 
national origin, but also because they are known to have Black or Jewish 
ancestors or because of their chosen expression of their cultural heritage, 
and thus, ethnicity.403 
D. Matters That Would Not Be Substantive(v Affected by the Proposal 
1. Affirmative Action 
Abandonment of the "race" concept will not restrict affirmative action 
programs. These policies do not depend upon the term "race" for their 
implementation, but rather, provide preferences to members of specific, 
identified minority groups. In Grutter v. Bollinger,404 for example, the 
University of Michigan Law School's program was formulated in terms of a 
commitment to "the inclusion of students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Native Americans."405 In Gratz v. Bollinger406 the affirmative action 
program adopted by the University of Michigan's College of Literature, 
Science and the Arts awarded twenty points to applicants who were 
"underrepresented minorities," which, in practice, meant African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.407 Employers and educational 
institutions could continue providing lawful preferences to minority group 
members by specifically naming the intended beneficiaries (i.e., African-
Americans, Hispanics, etc.)408 without any reference to whether these 
groups constitute "races. "409 
403. "Ethnicity" would need to be defmed since it is itself a vague term. A suggested 
definition for the hate crimes context is "chosen expression of cultural heritage." See supra Part 
IV.B.2. Alternatively, the tenns "culture" or "cultural expression" could be used. 
404. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
405. !d. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). 
406. 539 u.s. 244 (2003). 
407. !d. at 253-54. 
408. See supra notes 299-301 for a discussion of why the terms "African-American," 
"Hispanic," etc., should continue to be accepted, and why it may be important for minority 
communities to identify themselves as such. 
409. Because so many Americans are of mixed origin, it may not always be clear who is 
and is not a member of a particular minority group such as African-American or Hispanic. In 
cases that are not obvious based on name or appearance, administrators of affirmative action 
programs may rely on self-identification for purposes of awarding preferences or may require 
proof that the individual has parents or grandparents that are of the color or national origin in 
question. The problem of identifying appropriate beneficiaries exists whether or not the concept 
of "race" is retained. 
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With respect to the national debate concerning affmnative action, if 
anything, discontinuing the use of "race" terminology will promote more 
honest and lucid discussion of the issue. If proponents stopped 
characterizing the goal of affmnative action as "racial" diversity, they 
would be forced to articulate their aim in more coherent and candid terms.410 
Do we wish to achieve color diversity, socioeconomic diversity, the 
inclusion of specific under-represented groups, or something else? Reliance 
on the catchall phrase "racial diversity" does not advance the debate. 
2. Record-Keeping Requirements 
Federal record-keeping provisions411 require "race" information for 
purposes of enforcing and assessing the effectiveness of a variety of statutes 
and programs, such as the Voting Rights Act, state redistricting plans, 
federal affirmative action programs, and the Fair Housing Act.412 Generally, 
record-keeping will not be affected by the proposed change in terminology 
because agencies will continue to utilize the categories specified in 
Directive 15.413 Individuals, therefore, will still be identified for federal data 
collection purposes as American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or 
African American,414 Hispanic or Latino, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander, and White. 415 Statutes that mandate data collection could easily 
eliminate the term "race." They could simply instruct information gatherers 
to record the identity of federal aid recipients according to the categories 
provided by Directive 15 and thus avoid the problem of labeling the data as 
related to "race" or some other specific classification. 
3. California's Racial Privacy Initiative 
In October 2003, the "Racial Privacy Initiative,"416 a proposed 
amendment to the California constitution, was placed on California's 
410. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
411. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
412. 1994 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 271. 
413. See 1997 Revisions to Directive 15, supra note 272. 
414. Directive IS's definition of "Black or African American" would itself have to be 
changed so that it no longer refers to people originating "in any of the black racial groups of 
Africa." !d. The wording could be revised to include any "person having origins in any of the 
black people of Africa." Thus, this category would identifY individuals only based on their color 
and continent of origin. 
415. !d. 
416. Ballot Measure No. 14, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000-01). 
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ballot.417 The measure prohibited the state from classifying individuals by 
"race," ethnicity, color, or national origin with respect to public education, 
public contracting, public employment, or other state operations, with some 
exceptions.418 The proposal was heavily criticized for its potential to have a 
"devastating impact on the continued enforcement of state civil rights laws 
governing public education, employment, and contracting, as well as 
significantly affecting the state's business, healthcare, social welfare, 
environmental, and criminal justice institutions."419 Many feared that 
without tracking "racial" data, the state would be impeded in its effort to 
protect the health and welfare of minorities and to promote diversity and 
equal opportunity.420 The measure was ultimately defeated by a margin of 
two to one.421 
Disavowing the "race" concept would not encourage passage of bills 
such as the Racial Privacy Initiative. While the state would not be 
classifying individuals by "race," nothing would stop it from recording 
information concerning color and national origin or from identifying 
individuals as African-Americans, Hispanics, etc. The state could, therefore, 
develop information that is necessary to promote diversity and to combat 
phenomena such as hate crimes and racial profiling. The proposal outlined 
in this article is by no means a mechanism by which to divest minority 
groups of protection and benefits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the seminal affirmative action case of Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,422 Justice Blackmun wrote that "[i]n order to get 
beyond racism, we must first take account of race."423 An even better 
approach, however, is to eliminate the concept of "race" altogether. "Race" 
is not only "one of the most frequently misused and misunderstood words in 
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the American vemacular,"424 it is also a dangerous notion that can reinforce 
prejudice and discrimination. 
This article has argued that the term "race" should not be included in 
statutory and jurisprudential texts. It has proposed that "race" be replaced 
by wording that is selected in light of the purpose of each statute and the 
intended scope of its class of beneficiaries. In replacing the word "race," 
legislators could choose among the phrases "color," "national origin," 
"continent of origin," "descent from ancestors of a particular color, national 
origin, or religion," and "ethnicity," the last of which may itself require 
explication. 
Redacting the word "race" from the language of the law will not 
eliminate the problem of discrimination. There are still those who will 
believe that certain minorities are inferior to others and are unworthy of 
particular benefits or opportunities. It is for this reason that anti-
discrimination laws will continue to be needed. 
However, a shift away from the "race" concept will constitute an 
important step in the right direction. In the words of one commentator, 
"[ w ]ords still have power to create worlds and to become, if not flesh, at 
least an ordering force."425 Rejection of "race" terminology would 
symbolize the government's commitment to combat stereotypes and 
misconceptions concerning the existence of human subspecies. Substitution 
of more precise terminology that has less suggestive power and historical 
baggage may bring with it a shift in social ideology by emphasizing that 
what we perceive to be "racial" differences are only superficial distinctions, 
having to do with color and geographic origin.426 Finally, renunciation of 
the catchall "race" concept would require legislators to elucidate the 
intended beneficiary class of various statutes and would encourage both 
policymakers and those engaged in public debate to think more carefully 
about public policy goals. Dismantling the notion of "race," therefore, could 
go far in advancing civil rights and social progress. 
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